docs/grub: Document appended signature

This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of
a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables
introduced.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sudhakar Kuppusamy 2025-10-06 12:55:05 +05:30 committed by Daniel Kiper
parent 0f2dda8cf6
commit 3dff10a979

View File

@ -3281,8 +3281,10 @@ GRUB. Others may be used freely in GRUB configuration files.
These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
@menu
* appendedsig_key_mgmt::
* biosnum::
* blsuki_save_default::
* check_appended_signatures::
* check_signatures::
* chosen::
* cmdpath::
@ -3333,6 +3335,19 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
@end menu
@node appendedsig_key_mgmt
@subsection appendedsig_key_mgmt
This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation
using either @code{static} or @code{dynamic} key management. It is automatically
set by GRUB to either @code{static} or @code{dynamic} based on the
@strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device tree property and Platform KeyStore (PKS).
Also, it can be explicitly set to either @code{static} or @code{dynamic} by
setting the @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} variable from the GRUB console
when the GRUB is not locked down.
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@node biosnum
@subsection biosnum
@ -3353,6 +3368,17 @@ If this variable is set, menu entries generated from BLS config files
(@pxref{blscfg}) or UKI files (@pxref{uki}) will be set as the default boot
entry when selected.
@node check_appended_signatures
@subsection check_appended_signatures
This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
loaded kernel and GRUB module files. It is automatically set by GRUB
to either @code{no} or @code{yes} based on the @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device
tree property. Also, it can be explicitly set to either @code{no} or @code{yes} by
setting the @code{check_appended_signatures} variable from the GRUB console
when the GRUB is not locked down.
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@node check_signatures
@subsection check_signatures
@ -6546,6 +6572,13 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
@menu
* [:: Check file types and compare values
* acpi:: Load ACPI tables
* append_add_db_cert:: Add trusted certificate to the db list
* append_add_db_hash:: Add trusted certificate/binary hash to the db list
* append_add_dbx_cert:: Add distrusted certificate to the dbx list
* append_add_dbx_hash:: Add distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list
* append_list_db:: List all trusted certificates from the db list
* append_list_dbx:: List all distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list
* append_verify:: Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx lists
* authenticate:: Check whether user is in user list
* background_color:: Set background color for active terminal
* background_image:: Load background image for active terminal
@ -6669,6 +6702,140 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
unsigned code.
@end deffn
@node append_add_db_cert
@subsection append_add_db_cert
@deffn Command append_add_db_cert <X509_certificate>
Read an X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates.
These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the
environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
is set to @code{yes} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify})
command is executed from the GRUB console.
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@end deffn
@node append_add_db_hash
@subsection append_add_db_hash
@deffn Command append_add_db_hash <hash_file>
Read a binary hash from the file @var{hash_file}
and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted binary hashes. These
hashes are used to validate the Linux kernel/GRUB module binary hashes when the
environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures}
(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) is set to @code{yes} or the
@command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed
from the GRUB console.
Here is an example for how to generate a SHA-256 hash for a file. The hash
will be in binary format:
@example
# The vmlinux (kernel image) file is your binary file, and
# it should be unsigned.
#
# Generate the binary_hash.bin file from the vmlinux file
# using OpenSSL command
openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
@end example
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@end deffn
@node append_add_dbx_cert
@subsection append_add_dbx_cert
@deffn Command append_add_dbx_cert <X509_certificate>
Read an X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted certificates.
These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates
are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment
variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{yes}
(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify}
(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console.
Also, these certificates are used to prevent distrusted certificates from
being added to the db list later on.
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@end deffn
@node append_add_dbx_hash
@subsection append_add_dbx_hash
@deffn Command append_add_dbx_hash [@option{-b}|@option{-c}] <hash_file>
Read a binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}
and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted binary/certificate hashes.
When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
is set to @code{yes} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command
is executed from the GRUB console, then matching distrusted binary hashes or the signature
validation with distrusted certificates may lead to the rejection of the Linux kernel or GRUB modules.
Also, these hashes are used to prevent distrusted certificates and binary hashes from being
added to the db list later on.
The @option{-b} (@option{--binary-hash}) can be used to specify a binary hash file and
@option{-c} (@option{--cert-hash}) can be used to specify a certificate hash file.
Here is an example for how to generate a SHA-256 hash for a binary and a
certificate file. The hash will be in binary format:
@example
# The vmlinux (kernel image) file is your binary file, and
# it should be unsigned. The kernel.der is your certificate file.
#
# Generate the cert_hash.bin file from the kernel.der file
openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out cert_hash.bin kernel.der
# Generate the binary_hash.bin file from the vmlinux file
openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash.bin vmlinux
@end example
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@end deffn
@node append_list_db
@subsection append_list_db
@deffn Command append_list_db
List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating
appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes,
showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject,
public key algorithm, RSA public key size, and certificate fingerprint.
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@end deffn
@node append_list_dbx
@subsection append_list_dbx
@deffn Command append_list_dbx
List all the distrusted X.509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes.
The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes,
showing the certificate's version, serial number, issuer, subject,
public key algorithm, RSA public key size, and certificate fingerprint.
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@end deffn
@node append_verify
@subsection append_verify
@deffn Command append_verify <signed_file>
Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
and hashes known to GRUB (@pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
@pxref{append_add_db_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_hash} and @pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}).
Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully.
If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
@end deffn
@node authenticate
@subsection authenticate
@ -7507,6 +7674,13 @@ configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
information.
If the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} value is set to
@code{yes} and GRUB is in lockeddown mode, the user is not allowed to set
@code{check_appended_signatures} to @code{no} and @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} either directly using @command{load_env}
command or via environment block file. @xref{Using appended signatures}, for
more information.
@end deffn
@ -8902,11 +9076,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
@menu
* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
* Using appended signatures:: An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files
* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation
* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components
* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
* Signing certificate and hash files:: Certificate and hash file signing
* Signing GRUB itself:: Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
@end menu
@ -9067,6 +9243,127 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different
(attacker-controlled) device. GRUB is at best only one link in a
secure boot chain.
@node Using appended signatures
@section Using appended signatures in GRUB
GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for Linux on Power LPAR
secure boot. Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
with an appended signature ends with the magic string:
@example
~Module signature appended~\n
@end example
where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
Linux on Power LPAR secure boot is controlled by @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'}
device tree property and if this property is set to @code{2} (@samp{enforce}),
GRUB enters lockdown mode. There are three secure boot modes. They are
@itemize
@item @samp{0 - disabled}: Secure boot is disabled. This is the default.
@item @samp{1 - audit}: Enforce signature verification by setting
@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to
@code{yes} and do not enter lockdown mode. Signature verification
is performed and if signature verification fails, display the errors and
allow the boot to continue.
@item @samp{2 - enforce}: Enter lockdown mode and enforce signature verification by setting
@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to @code{yes}.
@end itemize
Note that Linux on Power LPAR only supports @samp{0 - disabled} and @samp{2 - enforce},
and @samp{1 - audit} is considered as secure boot being disabled.
Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the environment variable
@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}).
@itemize
@item @samp{no}: No verification is performed. This is the default.
@item @samp{yes}: Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails,
display the errors and stop the boot. Signature verification cannot be disabled by setting
the @code{check_appended_signatures} variable back to @samp{no}.
@end itemize
To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
X.509 certificate for verification. It is recommended to build the appendedsig module
into the core GRUB image.
Key management is controlled by the environment variable @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
(@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
@itemize
@item @samp{static}: Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the default.
When GRUB is in lockdown mode, then the user cannot change the value of the
@code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}.
@item @samp{dynamic}: Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When GRUB is in
lockdown mode, then the user cannot change the value of the @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}.
@end itemize
In static key management mode, certificates will be built into the core image using
the @code{--x509} parameter to @command{grub-mkimage}. The list of trusted certificates
available at boot time can be shown using @command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}).
Distrusted certificates can be explicitly removed from the db using @command{append_add_dbx_cert}
(@pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}). Also, trusted certificates can be explicitly added to the db using
@command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}).
In dynamic key management mode, db and dbx are read from the Platform KeyStore (PKS). If
db does not exist in PKS, static keys (built-in keys) are used as the default keys.
The list of trusted certificates and binary hashes available at boot time can be shown using
@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}) and the list of distrusted certificates and
binary/certificate hashes available at boot time can be shown using @command{append_list_dbx}
(@pxref{append_list_dbx}). The trusted certificates and binary hashes can be explicitly added
to the db using @command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}) and
@command{append_add_db_hash} (@pxref{append_add_db_hash}). Distrusted certificates can be explicitly
added to the dbx using @command{append_add_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}) and distrusted
certificate/binary hashes can be explicitly added to the dbx using @command{append_add_dbx_hash}
(@pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}).
A file can be explicitly verified using @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}).
Note that when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{yes},
the @command{append_add_db_cert} and @command{append_add_dbx_cert} commands only accept
the file @samp{@var{X509_certificate}} that is signed with an appended signature
(@pxref{Signing certificate and hash files}), and the @command{append_add_db_hash} and
@command{append_add_dbx_hash} commands only accept the file @samp{@var{hash_file}} that is
signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash files}).
The signature is verified by the appendedsig module.
When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{no},
these commands accept files without an appended signature.
Also, note that @samp{@var{X509_certificate}} should be in DER-format and @samp{@var{hash_file}}
should be in binary format. Only SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 hashes of binary/certificate are allowed.
Certificates/hashes of certificates/binaries added through @command{append_add_db_cert},
@command{append_add_dbx_cert}, @command{append_add_db_hash}, and @command{append_add_dbx_hash}
will not be persisted across boots.
Only signatures created using SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithm along with RSA keys of size 2048,
3072, or 4096 bits are supported.
A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
key and @code{certificate.der} as the X.509 certificate containing the public key:
@example
sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
@end example
Once signature verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
appended signatures:
@enumerate
@item Linux kernels
@item GRUB modules, except those built in to the core image
@item Any new certificate or binary hash files to be trusted
@item Any new certificate/binary hash files to be distrusted
@end enumerate
When GRUB is in lockdown mode (when secure boot mode is set to @code{enforce}),
signature verification cannot be @strong{disabled} by setting the
@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) variable
to @code{no} or using the @command{load_env} (@pxref{load_env}) command from
the GRUB console.
@node UEFI secure boot and shim
@section UEFI secure boot and shim support
@ -9596,6 +9893,34 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the
superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be
synchronized with LUKS key rotation.
@node Signing certificate and hash files
@section Signing certificate and hash files
X.509 certificate (public key) files and hash files (binary/certificate hash files)
can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style appended signature.
The signer.key is a private key used for signing and signer.der is the corresponding
public key (certificate) used for appended signature verification. Note that the
signer.der (certificate) should exist in the db (@pxref{Using appended signatures}).
@itemize
@item Signing the X.509 certificate file using @file{sign-file}.
The kernel.der is an X.509 certificate file.
@example
sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der kernel.der \
kernel.der.signed
@end example
@item Signing the hash file using @file{sign-file}.
The binary_hash.bin is a binary hash file.
@example
sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der binary_hash.bin \
binary_hash.signed
@end example
@end itemize
@node Signing GRUB itself
@section Signing GRUB itself
To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that