net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely

We can receive packets with invalid IP fragmentation information. This
can lead to rsm->total_len underflowing and becoming very large.

Then, in grub_netbuff_alloc(), we add to this very large number, which can
cause it to overflow and wrap back around to a small positive number.
The allocation then succeeds, but the resulting buffer is too small and
subsequent operations can write past the end of the buffer.

Catch the underflow here.

Fixes: CVE-2022-28733

Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Axtens 2021-12-20 19:41:21 +11:00 committed by Daniel Kiper
parent 830a9628b2
commit 3e4817538d

View File

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <grub/net/netbuff.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/priority_queue.h>
#include <grub/safemath.h>
#include <grub/time.h>
struct iphdr {
@ -512,7 +513,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb,
{
rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK)
+ (nb->tail - nb->data));
rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t),
&rsm->total_len))
{
grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n");
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len);
if (!rsm->asm_netbuff)
{