net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely
We can receive packets with invalid IP fragmentation information. This can lead to rsm->total_len underflowing and becoming very large. Then, in grub_netbuff_alloc(), we add to this very large number, which can cause it to overflow and wrap back around to a small positive number. The allocation then succeeds, but the resulting buffer is too small and subsequent operations can write past the end of the buffer. Catch the underflow here. Fixes: CVE-2022-28733 Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
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#include <grub/net/netbuff.h>
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#include <grub/mm.h>
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#include <grub/priority_queue.h>
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#include <grub/safemath.h>
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#include <grub/time.h>
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struct iphdr {
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@ -512,7 +513,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb,
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{
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rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK)
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+ (nb->tail - nb->data));
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rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
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if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t),
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&rsm->total_len))
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{
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grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n");
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return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
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}
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rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len);
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if (!rsm->asm_netbuff)
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{
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