This can be especially helpful, as the Fedora version of the blscfg
actually made use of positional arguments, but current implementation
switched to parameters. For example what used to be "blscfg (hd0,gpt2)/..."
now should be "blscfg --path (hd0,gpt2)/...)". In case of old configs/scripts
still supplying positional arguments we will now error out instead of just
ignoring them and falling back to defaults silently.
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Kolev <radoslav.kolev@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Currently if the fallback option is enabled and no files are found in
the specified directory it searches the default (loader/conf) directory
but always in the device set by the root environment variable. It makes
more sense and also the comment in the code implies, that the default
directory on the current device should be searched.
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Kolev <radoslav.kolev@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The DIR parameter in the example should be specified after the -p|--path option
instead of after -f|fallback.
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Kolev <radoslav.kolev@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Fix possible and absolute memory leaks of "handles"
returned by grub_efi_locate_handle() using grub_malloc().
Signed-off-by: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Let the lsefisystab command recognize the following table GUIDs:
- EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID,
- EFI_TCG2_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The implementation in sd-boot was changed to return UINT32_MAX when
the EFI environment detects a working TPM2, but with an older firmware
that doesn't implement the protocol to get the list of active banks.
This allows distinguishing with the case where there is no working TPM2,
in which case userspace just gives up, and instead lets userspace try to
figure it out later.
Fixes: f326c5c47 (commands/bli: Set LoaderTpm2ActivePcrBanks runtime variable)
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The grub_strtol() call in blsuki_is_default_entry() can set grub_errno
to either GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER or GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE if the input
string is invalid or out of range.
This grub_errno value is currently left uncleared, which can lead to
unexpected behavior in subsequent functions that rely on checking
current state of grub_errno.
Clear grub_errno unconditionally when grub_strtol() reports error so
that we can plug the leak.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
If descstrp->length is less than 2 this will result in underflow in
"descstrp->length / 2 - 1" math. Let's fix the check to make sure the
value is sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Jamie <volticks@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
An incorrect length field is used for buffer allocation. This leads to
grub_utf16_to_utf8() receiving an incorrect/different length and possibly
causing OOB write. This makes sure to use the correct length.
Fixes: CVE-2025-61661
Reported-by: Jamie <volticks@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamie <volticks@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The commit c68b7d236 (commands/test: Stack overflow due to unlimited
recursion depth) added recursion depth tests to the test command. But in
the error case it decrements the pointer to the depth value instead of
the value itself. Fix it.
Fixes: c68b7d236 (commands/test: Stack overflow due to unlimited recursion depth)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Frauendorfer | Miray Software <tf@miray.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Prints memory regions general information including size, number of
blocks, total free and total allocated memory per region. The reason
behind is to have a tool that shows general information about regions
and how fragmented the memory is at some particular time.
Below is an example showing how this tool before and after memory stress.
grub> lsmemregions
Region 0x78f6e000 (size 33554368 blocks 1048574 free 27325472 alloc 6232768)
> stress_big_allocations
...
grub> lsmemregions
Region 0x7af8e000 (size 4032 blocks 126 free 2720 alloc 1312)
Region 0x80c000 (size 81856 blocks 2558 free 81856 alloc 0)
Region 0x7d165000 (size 167872 blocks 5246 free 167872 alloc 0)
Region 0x7d0bf000 (size 655296 blocks 20478 free 655296 alloc 0)
Region 0x7ee00000 (size 1331136 blocks 41598 free 1331136 alloc 0)
Region 0x100000 (size 7385024 blocks 230782 free 7385024 alloc 0)
Region 0x7af95000 (size 25382848 blocks 793214 free 25382848 alloc 0)
Region 0x1780000 (size 2038357952 blocks 63698686 free 2077517536 alloc 5445568)
Signed-off-by: Leo Sandoval <lsandova@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
A menu entry with an empty title leads to an out-of-bounds access at
"ch = src[len - 1]", i.e., "src" is empty and "len" is zero. So, fixing
this by checking the menu entry title length and throwing an error if
the length is zero.
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
To prevent a sealed key from being unsealed again, a common and
straightforward method is to "cap" the key by extending the associated
PCRs. When the PCRs associated with the sealed key are extended, TPM will
be unable to unseal the key, as the PCR values required for unsealing no
longer match, effectively rendering the key unusable until the next
system boot or a state where the PCRs are reset to their expected values.
To cap a specific set of PCRs, simply append the argument '-c pcr_list'
to the tpm2_key_protector command. Upon successfully unsealing the key,
the TPM2 key protector will then invoke tpm2_protector_cap_pcrs(). This
function extends the selected PCRs with an EV_SEPARATOR event,
effectively "capping" them. Consequently, the associated key cannot be
unsealed in any subsequent attempts until these PCRs are reset to their
original, pre-capped state, typically occurring upon the next system
boot.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This commit implements grub_tcg2_cap_pcr() for ieee1275 with the
firmware function, 2hash-ext-log, to extend the target PCR with an
EV_SEPARATOR event and record the event into the TPM event log.
To avoid duplicate code, ibmvtpm_2hash_ext_log() is moved to tcg2.c
and exported as a global function.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
During command registration, grub_register_command_prio() returns
a 0 when there is a failure in memory allocation. In such a situation,
calls to grub_unregister_{command(), extcmd()} during command
unregistration will result in dereferencing a NULL pointer.
Perform explicit NULL check in both unregister helpers to prevent
undefined behaviour due to a NULL pointer dereference.
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The call was added in the 1.1 revision of the spec, 1.0 does
not have it, and there are some machines out there with a TPM2
and a UEFI firmware that only supports version 1.0, so the
call fails in those cases. Check the reported version before
calling get_active_pcr_banks().
See Table 4 in section 6.2 of the TCG EFI Protocol Specification:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EFI-Protocol-Specification-rev13-160330final.pdf
Fixes: f326c5c47 (commands/bli: Set LoaderTpm2ActivePcrBanks runtime variable)
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage certificate/binary
hashes.
1. append_list_dbx:
Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate
hashes from the dbx list.
2. append_add_db_hash:
Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
3. append_add_dbx_hash:
Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.
Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signatures) is set to yes,
the append_add_db_hash and append_add_dbx_hash commands only accept the file
‘hash_file’ that is signed with an appended signature.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage the certificates.
1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3. append_add_dbx_cert:
Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list
4. append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list
Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signatures) is set to yes,
the append_add_db_cert and append_add_dbx_cert commands only accept the file
‘X509_certificate’ that is signed with an appended signature.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signature verification: verify the kernel against lists of hashes that are
either in dbx or db list. If it is not in the dbx list then the trusted keys
from the db list are used to verify the signature.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
If secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted
certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list.
If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted
certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS
and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash
are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists usage is
added by a subsequent patch.
Note:
- If db does not exist in the PKS storage, then read the static keys as a db
default keys from the GRUB ELF Note and add them into the db list.
- If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then do not
add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Introducing the appended signature key management environment variable. It is
automatically set to either "static" or "dynamic" based on the Platform KeyStore.
"static": Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the
default. When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value
by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic".
"dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB
is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the
appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static".
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well
as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended
signatures.
This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and
GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
Signature verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures.
If secure boot is enabled with enforce mode when the appendedsig module is
loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted keys will be
extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and locked automatically.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This code allows us to parse:
- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7
messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf
certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.
- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by
verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> # EKU support
Reported-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.com> # key usage issue
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This code allows us to parse:
- PKCS#7 signed data messages. Only a single signer info is supported, which
is all that the Linux sign-file utility supports creating out-of-the-box.
Only RSA, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are supported. Any certificate embedded in
the PKCS#7 message will be ignored.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This code allows us to parse ASN1 node and allocating memory to store it.
It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
- Integers
- Octet strings
- DER encoding of other structures
It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
- Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
- Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In order to parse PKCS#7 messages and X.509 certificates with libtasn1, we need
some information about how they are encoded. We get these from GNUTLS, which has
the benefit that they support the features we need and are well tested.
The GNUTLS files are from:
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn
The GNUTLS license is LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3 compatible, allowing us to import
it without issue.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Prior to the addition of the X.509 public key support for appended signature,
current PGP signature relied on the GPG public key. Changing the enum name
from "OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY" to "OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY" to differentiate between x509
certificate based appended signature and GPG certificate based PGP signature.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The way gcry_rsa and friends (the asymmetric ciphers) are loaded for the
pgp module is a bit quirky.
include/grub/crypto.h contains:
extern struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
commands/pgp.c contains the actual storage:
struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
And the module itself saves to the storage in pgp.c:
GRUB_MOD_INIT(gcry_rsa)
{
grub_crypto_pk_rsa = &_gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;
}
This is annoying: gcry_rsa now has a dependency on pgp!
We want to be able to bring in gcry_rsa without bringing in PGP, so move the
storage to crypto.c.
Previously, gcry_rsa depended on pgp and mpi. Now it depends on crypto and mpi.
As pgp depends on crypto, this doesn't add any new module dependencies using
the PGP verfier.
[FWIW, the story is different for the symmetric ciphers. cryptodisk and friends
(zfs encryption etc) use grub_crypto_lookup_cipher_by_name() to get a cipher
handle. That depends on grub_ciphers being populated by people calling
grub_cipher_register. import_gcry.py ensures that the symmetric ciphers call it.]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
A Unified Kernel Image (UKI) is a single UEFI PE file that combines
a UEFI boot stub, a Linux kernel image, an initrd, and further resources.
The uki command will locate where the UKI file is and create a GRUB menu
entry to load it.
The Unified Kernel Image Specification: https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/unified_kernel_image/
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Irritatingly, BLS defines paths relative to the mountpoint of the
filesystem which contains its snippets, not / or any other fixed
location. So grub-emu needs to know whether /boot is a separate
filesystem from / and conditionally prepend a path.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The BootLoaderSpec (BLS) defines a scheme where different bootloaders can
share a format for boot items and a configuration directory that accepts
these common configurations as drop-in files.
The BLS Specification: https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/boot_loader_specification/
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Thompson <wjt@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It turns out checking from userspace is not 100% reliable to figure out
whether the firmware had TPM2 support enabled or not. For example with
EDK2 arm64, the default upstream build config bundles TPM2 support with
SecureBoot support, so if the latter is disabled, TPM2 is also unavailable.
But still, the ACPI TPM2 table is created just as if it was enabled. So,
/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/TPM2 exists and looks correct but there are no
measurements, neither the firmware nor the loader/stub can do them, and
/sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements does not exist.
So, userspace cannot really tell what was going on in UEFI mode.
The loader can use the apposite UEFI protocol to check, which is a more
definitive answer. Export the bitmask with the list of active banks as-is.
If it's not 0, then in userspace we can be sure a working TPM2 was available
in UEFI mode.
systemd-boot and systemd-stub v258 (current main) set this variable and
userspace portion consumes it to be able to tell what was available in
the firmware context.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This patches modifies the GRUB-libgcrypt API to match new libgcrypt 1.11.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
TPM 2.0 Key File format stores the PCR selection in the parameters
for TPM2_PolicyPCR and it already contains the selected PCR bank.
Currently, tpm2_key_protector dumped the PCR bank specified by the
--bank option, and it may not be the PCR bank for key unsealing.
To dump the real PCR bank for key unsealing, this commit records the PCR
bank used by TPM2_PolicyPCR and dumps PCR values from that bank when
necessary.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The option can be used to suppress output if we only want to test the
return value of the command.
Also, mention this option in the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This commit adds the grub_cryptodisk_erasesecrets() function to wipe
master keys from all cryptodisks. This function is EFI-only.
Since there is no easy way to "force unmount" a given encrypted disk,
this function renders all mounted cryptodisks unusable. An attempt to
read them will return garbage.
This is why this function must be used in "no way back" conditions.
Currently, it is used when unloading the cryptodisk module and when
performing the "exit" command (it is often used to switch to the next
EFI application). This function is not called when performing the
"chainloader" command, because the callee may return to GRUB. For this
reason, users are encouraged to use "exit" instead of "chainloader" to
execute third-party boot applications.
This function does not guarantee that all secrets are wiped from RAM.
Console output, chunks from disk read requests and other may remain.
This function does not clear the IV prefix and rekey key for geli disks.
Also, this commit adds the relevant documentation improvements.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
When the --cryptodisk-only argument is given, also check the target
device using the "cryptocheck" command, if available.
This extends the checks to common layouts like LVM-on-LUKS, so the
--cryptodisk-only argument transparently handles such setups.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This allows users to restrict the "search" command's scope to
encrypted disks only.
Typically, this command is used to "rebase" $root and $prefix
before loading additional configuration files via "source" or
"configfile". Unfortunately, this leads to security problems,
like CVE-2023-4001, when an unexpected, attacker-controlled
device is chosen by the "search" command.
The --cryptodisk-only argument allows users to ensure that the
file system picked is encrypted.
This feature supports the CLI authentication, blocking bypass
attempts.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Previously, NV index mode only supported persistent handles which are
only for TPM objects.
On the other hand, the "NV index" handle allows the user-defined data,
so it can be an alternative to the key file and support TPM 2.0 Key
File format immediately.
The following tpm2-tools commands store the given key file, sealed.tpm,
in either TPM 2.0 Key File format or the raw format into the NV index
handle 0x1000000.
# tpm2_nvdefine -C o \
-a "ownerread|ownerwrite" \
-s $(stat -c %s sealed.tpm) \
0x1000000
# tpm2_nvwrite -C o -i sealed.tpm 0x1000000
To unseal the key in GRUB, add the "tpm2_key_protector_init" command to
grub.cfg:
tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x1000000
cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2
To remove the NV index handle:
# tpm2_nvundefine -C o 0x1000000
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Extract the logic to handle the file buffer from the SRK recover
function to prepare to load the sealed key from the NV index handle,
so the NV index mode can share the same code path in the later patch.
The SRK recover function now only reads the file and sends the file
buffer to the new function.
Besides this, to avoid introducing more options for the NV index mode,
the file format is detected automatically before unmarshaling the data,
so there is no need to use the command option to specify the file format
anymore. In other words, "-T" and "-k" are the same now.
Also update grub.text to address the change.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The user may need to inspect the TPM 2.0 PCR values with the GRUB shell,
so the new tpm2_dump_pcr command is added to print all PCRs of the
specified bank.
Also update the document for the new command.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
PCR mismatch is one common cause of TPM key unsealing fail. Since the
system may be compromised, it is not safe to boot into OS to get the PCR
values and TPM eventlog for the further investigation.
To provide some hints, GRUB now dumps PCRs on policy fail, so the user
can check the current PCR values. PCR 0~15 are chosen to cover the
firmware, bootloader, and OS.
The sample output:
PCR Mismatch! Check firmware and bootloader before typing passphrase!
TPM PCR [sha256]:
00: 17401f37710984c1d8a03a81fff3ab567ae9291bac61e21715b890ee28879738
01: 7a114329ba388445a96e8db2a072785937c1b7a8803ed7cc682b87f3ff3dd7a8
02: 11c2776849e8e24b7d80c926cbc4257871bffa744dadfefd3ed049ce25143e05
03: 6c33b362073e28e30b47302bbdd3e6f9cee4debca3a304e646f8c68245724350
04: 62d38838483ecfd2484ee3a2e5450d8ca3b35fc72cda6a8c620f9f43521c37d1
05: d8a85cb37221ab7d1f2cc5f554dbe0463acb6784b5b8dc3164ccaa66d8fff0e1
06: 9262e37cbe71ed4daf815b4a4881fb7251c9d371092dde827557d5368121e10e
07: 219d542233be492d62b079ffe46cf13396a8c27e520e88b08eaf2e6d3b7e70f5
08: de1f61c973b673e505adebe0d7e8fb65fde6c24dd4ab4fbaff9e28b18df6ecd3
09: c1de7274fa3e879a16d7e6e7629e3463d95f68adcfd17c477183846dccc41c89
10: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
11: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
12: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
13: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
14: 9ab9ebe4879a7f4dd00c04f37e79cfd69d0dd7a8bcc6b01135525b67676a3e40
15: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
16: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
17: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
18: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
19: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
20: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
21: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
22: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
23: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
error: failed to unseal sealed key (TPM2_Unseal: 0x99d).
error: no key protector provided a usable key for luks (af16e48f-746b-4a12-aae1-c14dcee429e0).
If the user happens to have the PCR values for key sealing, the PCR dump
can be used to identify the changed PCRs and narrow down the scope for
closer inspection.
Please note that the PCR dump is trustworthy only if the GRUB binary is
authentic, so the user has to check the GRUB binary thoroughly before
using the PCR dump.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Like the GNU ls, first print a line with the directory path before printing
files in the directory, which will not have a directory component, but only
if there is more than one argument.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
For arguments that are paths to files, print the full path of the file.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The modification time for paths to files was not being printed because
the grub_dirhook_info, which contains the mtime, was initialized to NULL.
Instead of calling print_file() directly, use fs->fs_dir() to call
print_file() with a properly filled in grub_dirhook_info. This has the
added benefit of reducing code complexity.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Simplify the code by removing logic around which file printer to call.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
