Fixes: 58ea11d5b (fs/hfsplus: Don't fetch a key beyond the end of the node)
Signed-off-by: t.feng <fengtao40@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The l1_entries and l2_entries were not freed at the end of file read.
Fixes: 5825b3794 (BFS implementation based on the specification)
Signed-off-by: t.feng <fengtao40@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The hashtable is not freed if GRUB_AFFS_FILETYPE_HARDLINK and
grub_disk_read() failed. If grub_affs_create_node() returns non-zero
the hashtable should be freed too.
By the way, the hashtable argument is unused in grub_affs_create_node().
So, we can remove the argument and free it in grub_affs_iterate_dir().
It allocates the memory and it should be responsible for releasing it.
This is why commit ebf32bc4e9 (fs/affs: Fix resource leaks) missed
this memory leak.
Fixes: ebf32bc4e9 (fs/affs: Fix resource leaks)
Signed-off-by: t.feng <fengtao40@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Validate the length of Allocation Extent Descriptor in grub_udf_read_block(),
based on the details in UDF spec. v2.01 section 2.3.11.
Fixes: CID 314037
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The dnode_get_path() traverses dnode structures to locate the dnode leaf
of a given path. When the leaf is a symlink to another path, it restarts
the traversal either from root or from a different path. In such cases,
dn_new must be re-initialized
Passes "make check".
Fixes: CID 86750
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Recently, ext4 added the large_dir feature, which adds support for
a 3 level htree directory support.
The GRUB supports existing file systems with htree directories by
ignoring their existence, and since the index nodes for the hash tree
look like deleted directory entries (by design), the GRUB can simply do
a brute force O(n) linear search of directories. The same is true for
3 level deep htrees indicated by large_dir feature flag.
Hence, it is safe for the GRUB to ignore the large_dir incompat feature.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?61606
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Coverity reports that dnode_end_t argument of fill_fs_info() is too
large to pass-by-value. Therefore, replace the argument with a pointer.
Fixes: CID 73631
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It will be desirable in the future to allow having the read hook modify the
data passed back from a read function call on a disk or file. This adds that
infrastructure and has no impact on code flow for existing uses of the read
hook. Also changed is that now when the read hook callback is called it can
also indicate what error code should be sent back to the read caller.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The corpus was generating issues in grub_btrfs_read_logical() when
attempting to iterate over stripe entries in the superblock's
bootmapping.
In most cases the reason for the failure was that the number of stripes
in chunk->nstripes exceeded the possible space statically allocated in
superblock bootmapping space. Each stripe entry in the bootmapping block
consists of a grub_btrfs_key followed by a grub_btrfs_chunk_stripe.
Another issue that came up was that while calculating the chunk size,
in an earlier piece of code in that function, depending on the data
provided in the btrfs file system, it would end up calculating a size
that was too small to contain even 1 grub_btrfs_chunk_item, which is
obviously invalid too.
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The fuzzer is generating btrfs file systems that have chunks with
invalid combinations of stripes and substripes for the given RAID
configurations.
After examining the Linux kernel fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c code, it
appears that sub-stripes should only be applied to RAID10, and in that
case there should only ever be 2 of them.
Similarly, RAID single should only have 1 stripe, and RAID1/1C3/1C4
should have 2. 3 or 4 stripes respectively, which is what redundancy
corresponds.
Some of the chunks ended up with a size of 0, which grub_malloc() still
returned memory for and in turn generated ASAN errors later when
accessed.
While it would be possible to specifically limit the number of stripes,
a more correct test was on the combination of the chunk item, and the
number of stripes by the size of the chunk stripe structure in
comparison to the size of the chunk itself.
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
According to the btrfs code in Linux, the structure of a directory item
leaf should be of the form:
|struct btrfs_dir_item|name|data|
in GRUB the name len and data len are in the grub_btrfs_dir_item
structure's n and m fields respectively.
The combined size of the structure, name and data should be less than
the allocated memory, a difference to the Linux kernel's struct
btrfs_dir_item is that the grub_btrfs_dir_item has an extra field for
where the name is stored, so we adjust for that too.
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
A corrupt f2fs file system might specify a name length which is greater
than the maximum name length supported by the GRUB f2fs driver.
We will allocate enough memory to store the overly long name, but there
are only F2FS_NAME_LEN bytes in the source, so we would read past the end
of the source.
While checking directory entries, do not copy a file name with an invalid
length.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
A corrupt f2fs filesystem could have a block offset or a bitmap
offset that would cause us to read beyond the bounds of the nat
bitmap.
Introduce the nat_bitmap_size member in grub_f2fs_data which holds
the size of nat bitmap.
Set the size when loading the nat bitmap in nat_bitmap_ptr(), and
catch when an invalid offset would create a pointer past the end of
the allocated space.
Check against the bitmap size in grub_f2fs_test_bit() test bit to avoid
reading past the end of the nat bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
A corrupt f2fs file system could specify a nat journal entry count
that is beyond the maximum NAT_JOURNAL_ENTRIES.
Check if the specified nat journal entry count before accessing the
array, and throw an error if it is too large.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Coverity reports that while loopis in the following functions uses
tainted data as boundary:
zfs_mount() -> check_mos_features() -> dnode_get() -> zfs_log2()
zfs_mount() -> grub_memmove()
The defect type is "Untrusted loop bound" caused as a result of
"tainted_data_downcast". Coverity does not like the pointer downcast
here and we need to address it.
We believe Coverity flags pointer downcast for the following two
reasons:
1. External data: The pointer downcast could indicate that the source is
external data, which we need to further sanitize - such as verifying its
limits. In this case, the data is read from an external source, which is
a disk. But, zio_read(), which reads the data from the disk, sanitizes it
using a checksum. checksum is the best facility that ZFS offers to verify
external data, and we don't believe a better way exists. Therefore, no
further action is possible for this.
2. Corruption due to alignment: downcasting a pointer from a strict type
to less strict type could result in data corruption. For example, the
following cast would corrupt because uint32_t is 4-byte aligned, and
won't be able to point to 0x1003 which is not 4-byte aligned.
uint8_t *ptr = 0x1003;
uint32_t *word = ptr; (incorrect, alignment issues)
This patch converts the "osp" pointer in zfs_mount() from a "void" type
to "objset_phys_t" type to address this issue.
We are not sure if there are any other reasons why Coverity flags the
downcast. However, the fix for alignment issue masks/suppresses any
other issues from showing up.
Fixes: CID 314023
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Coverity reports that the while loop in the following function uses
tainted data as boundary:
fill_fs_info() -> dnode_get() -> zfs_log2()
The tainted originated from:
fill_fs_info() -> make_mdn()
The defect type is "Untrusted loop bound" caused as a result of
"tainted_data_downcast". Coverity does not like the pointer downcast
here and we need to address it.
We believe Coverity flags pointer downcast for the following two
reasons:
1. External data: The pointer downcast could indicate that the source is
external data, which we need to further sanitize - such as verifying its
limits. In this case, the data is read from an external source, which is
a disk. But, zio_read(), which reads the data from the disk, sanitizes it
using a checksum. checksum is the best facility that ZFS offers to verify
external data, and we don't believe a better way exists. Therefore, no
further action is possible for this.
2. Corruption due to alignment: downcasting a pointer from a strict type
to less strict type could result in data corruption. For example, the
following cast would corrupt because uint32_t is 4-byte aligned, and
won't be able to point to 0x1003 which is not 4-byte aligned.
uint8_t *ptr = 0x1003;
uint32_t *word = ptr; (incorrect, alignment issues)
This patch converts the "osp" pointer in make_mdn() from a "void" type
to "objset_phys_t" type to address the issue.
We are not sure if there are any other reasons why Coverity flags the
downcast. However, the fix for alignment issue masks/suppresses any
other issues from showing up.
Fixes: CID 314020
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The GRUB is failing to build with GCC-12 in many places like this:
In function 'init_cbfsdisk',
inlined from 'grub_mod_init' at ../../grub-core/fs/cbfs.c:391:3:
../../grub-core/fs/cbfs.c:345:7: error: array subscript 0 is outside array bounds of 'grub_uint32_t[0]' {aka 'unsigned int[]'} [-Werror=array-bounds]
345 | ptr = *(grub_uint32_t *) 0xfffffffc;
| ~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This is caused by GCC regression in 11/12 [1]. In a nut shell, the
warning is about detected invalid accesses at non-zero offsets to NULL
pointers. Since hardwired constant address is treated as NULL plus an
offset in the same underlying code, the warning is therefore triggered.
Instead of inserting #pragma all over the places where literal pointers
are accessed to avoid diagnosing array-bounds, we can try to borrow the
idea from Linux kernel that the absolute_pointer() macro [2][3] is used
to disconnect a pointer using literal address from it's original object,
hence GCC won't be able to make assumptions on the boundary while doing
pointer arithmetic. With that we can greatly reduce the code we have to
cover up by making initial literal pointer assignment to use the new
wrapper but not having to track everywhere literal pointers are
accessed. This also makes code looks cleaner.
Please note the grub_absolute_pointer() macro requires to be invoked in
a function as long as it is compound expression. Some global variables
with literal pointers has been changed to local ones in order to use
grub_absolute_pointer() to initialize it. The shuffling is basically done
in a selective and careful way that the variable's scope doesn't matter
being local or global, for example, the global variable must not get
modified at run time throughout. For the record, here's the list of
global variables got shuffled in this patch:
grub-core/commands/i386/pc/drivemap.c:int13slot
grub-core/term/i386/pc/console.c:bios_data_area
grub-core/term/ns8250.c:serial_hw_io_addr
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99578
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.16.14/source/include/linux/compiler.h#L180
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.16.14/source/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h#L31
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In commit 178ac5107389 (affs: Fix memory leaks), fixes were made to
grub_affs_iterate_dir() to prevent memory leaks from occurring after it
returns without freeing node. However, there were still some instances
where node was causing a memory leak when the function returns after
calling grub_affs_create_node(). In this function, new memory is
allocated to node but doesn't get freed until the hook() function is
called near the end. Before hook() is called, node should be freed in
grub_affs_create_node() before returning out of it.
Fixes: 178ac5107389 (affs: Fix memory leaks)
Fixes: CID 73759
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Up to now GRUB can only embed to the first 64 KiB before primary
superblock of btrfs, effectively limiting the GRUB core size. That
could consequently pose restrictions to feature enablement like
advanced zstd compression.
This patch attempts to utilize full unused area reserved by btrfs for
the bootloader outlined in the document [1]:
The first 1MiB on each device is unused with the exception of primary
superblock that is on the offset 64KiB and spans 4KiB.
Apart from that, adjacent sectors to superblock and first block group
are not used for embedding in case of overflow and logged access to
adjacent sectors could be useful for tracing it up.
This patch has been tested to provide out of the box support for btrfs
zstd compression with which GRUB has been installed to the partition.
[1] https://btrfs.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Manpage/btrfs(5)#BOOTLOADER_SUPPORT
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The GRUB btrfs implementation can't handle two very basic btrfs
file layouts:
1. Mixed inline/regualr extents
# mkfs.btrfs -f test.img
# mount test.img /mnt/btrfs
# xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1k" -c "sync" -c "falloc 0 4k" \
-c "pwrite 4k 4k" /mnt/btrfs/file
# umount /mnt/btrfs
# ./grub-fstest ./grub-fstest --debug=btrfs ~/test.img hex "/file"
Such mixed inline/regular extents case is not recommended layout,
but all existing tools and kernel can handle it without problem.
2. NO_HOLES feature
# mkfs.btrfs -f test.img -O no_holes
# mount test.img /mnt/btrfs
# xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 4k" -c "pwrite 8k 4k" /mnt/btrfs/file
# umount /mnt/btrfs
# ./grub-fstest ./grub-fstest --debug=btrfs ~/test.img hex "/file"
NO_HOLES feature is going to be the default mkfs feature in the incoming
v5.15 release, and kernel has support for it since v4.0.
The way GRUB btrfs code iterates through file extents relies on no gap
between extents.
If any gap is hit, then GRUB btrfs will error out, without any proper
reason to help debug the bug.
This is a bad assumption, since a long long time ago btrfs has a new
feature called NO_HOLES to allow btrfs to skip the padding hole extent
to reduce metadata usage.
The NO_HOLES feature is already stable since kernel v4.0 and is going to
be the default mkfs feature in the incoming v5.15 btrfs-progs release.
When there is a extent gap, instead of error out, just try next item.
This is still not ideal, as kernel/progs/U-boot all do the iteration
item by item, not relying on the file offset continuity.
But it will be way more time consuming to correct the whole behavior than
starting from scratch to build a proper designed btrfs module for GRUB.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In zap_leaf_array_get() the chunk size passed in is considered tainted
by Coverity, and is being used before it is tested for validity. To fix
this the assignment of "la" is moved until after the test of the value
of "chunk".
Fixes: CID 314014
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
When a file on ext4 is stored as sparse the data belonging to
zero-filled blocks is not written to storage and the extent map is
missing entries for these blocks. Such case can happen both for depth
0 extents (leafs) as well as higher-level tables.
Consider a scenario of a file which has a zero-filled beginning (e.g.
ISO image). In such case real data starts at block 8. If such a file is
stored using 2-level extent structure the extent list in the inode will
be depth 1 and will have an entry to a depth 0 (leaf) extent header for
blocks 8-n.
Unfortunately existing GRUB2 ext2 driver is only able to handle missing
entries in leaf extent tables, for which the grub_ext2_read_block()
function returns 0. In case the whole leaf extent list is missing for
a block the function fails with "invalid extent" error.
The fix for this problem relies on the grub_ext4_find_leaf() helper
function to distinguish two error cases: missing extent and error
walking through the extent tree. The existing error message is raised
only for the latter case, while for the missing leaf extent zero is
returned from grub_ext2_read_block() indicating a sparse block.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Nowicki <krzysztof.nowicki@nokia.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This code was broken by commit 3f05d693 (malloc: Use overflow checking
primitives where we do complex allocations), which added overflow
checking in many areas. The problem here is that the changes update the
local variable sz, which was already in use and which was not updated
before the change. So the code using sz was getting a different value of
than it would have previously for the same UDF image. This causes the
logic getting the destination of the symlink to not realize that its
gotten the full destination, but keeps trying to read past the end of
the destination. The bytes after the end are generally NULL padding
bytes, but that's not a valid component type (ECMA-167 14.16.1.1). So
grub_udf_read_symlink() branches to error logic, returning NULL, instead
of the symlink destination path.
The result of this bug is that the UDF filesystem tests were failing in
the symlink test with the grub-fstest error message:
grub-fstest: error: cannot open `(loop0)/sym': invalid symlink.
This change stores the result of doubling sz in another local variable s,
so as not to modify sz. Also remove unnecessary grub_add(), which increased
the output by 1, presumably to account for a NULL byte. This isn't needed
because an output buffer of size twice sz is already guaranteed to be more
than enough to contain the path components converted to UTF-8. The value of
sz contains at least 4 bytes for the path component header (ECMA-167 14.16.1),
which means that 2 * 4 bytes are allocated but will not be used for UTF-8
characters, so the NULL byte is accounted for.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The commit 8b1e5d193 (fs/xfs: Add bigtime incompat feature support)
introduced the bigtime support by adding some features in v3 inodes.
This change extended grub_xfs_inode struct by 76 bytes but also changed
the computation of XFS_V2_INODE_SIZE and XFS_V3_INODE_SIZE. Prior this
commit, XFS_V2_INODE_SIZE was 100 bytes. After the commit it's 84 bytes
XFS_V2_INODE_SIZE becomes 16 bytes too small.
As a result, the data structures aren't properly aligned and the GRUB
generates "attempt to read or write outside of partition" errors when
trying to read the XFS filesystem:
GNU GRUB version 2.11
....
grub> set debug=efi,gpt,xfs
grub> insmod part_gpt
grub> ls (hd0,gpt1)/
partmap/gpt.c:93: Read a valid GPT header
partmap/gpt.c:115: GPT entry 0: start=4096, length=1953125
fs/xfs.c:931: Reading sb
fs/xfs.c:270: Validating superblock
fs/xfs.c:295: XFS v4 superblock detected
fs/xfs.c:962: Reading root ino 128
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (128) - 64, 0
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (739521961424144223) - 344365866970255880, 3840
error: attempt to read or write outside of partition.
This commit change the XFS_V2_INODE_SIZE computation by subtracting 76
bytes instead of 92 bytes from the actual size of grub_xfs_inode struct.
This 76 bytes value comes from added members:
20 grub_uint8_t unused5
1 grub_uint64_t flags2
48 grub_uint8_t unused6
This patch explicitly splits the v2 and v3 parts of the structure.
The unused4 is still ending of the v2 structures and the v3 starts
at unused5. Thanks to this we will avoid future corruptions of v2
or v3 inodes.
The XFS_V2_INODE_SIZE is returning to its expected size and the
filesystem is back to a readable state:
GNU GRUB version 2.11
....
grub> set debug=efi,gpt,xfs
grub> insmod part_gpt
grub> ls (hd0,gpt1)/
partmap/gpt.c:93: Read a valid GPT header
partmap/gpt.c:115: GPT entry 0: start=4096, length=1953125
fs/xfs.c:931: Reading sb
fs/xfs.c:270: Validating superblock
fs/xfs.c:295: XFS v4 superblock detected
fs/xfs.c:962: Reading root ino 128
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (128) - 64, 0
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (128) - 64, 0
fs/xfs.c:931: Reading sb
fs/xfs.c:270: Validating superblock
fs/xfs.c:295: XFS v4 superblock detected
fs/xfs.c:962: Reading root ino 128
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (128) - 64, 0
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (128) - 64, 0
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (128) - 64, 0
fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (131) - 64, 768
efi/ fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (3145856) - 1464904, 0
grub2/ fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (132) - 64, 1024
grub/ fs/xfs.c:515: Reading inode (139) - 64, 2816
grub>
Fixes: 8b1e5d193 (fs/xfs: Add bigtime incompat feature support)
Signed-off-by: Erwan Velu <e.velu@criteo.com>
Tested-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This incompat feature is used to denote that the filesystem stored its
metadata checksum seed in the superblock. This is used to allow tune2fs
changing the UUID on a mounted metdata_csum filesystem without having
to rewrite all the disk metadata. However, the GRUB doesn't use the
metadata checksum at all. So, it can just ignore this feature if it
is enabled. This is consistent with the GRUB filesystem code in general
which just does a best effort to access the filesystem's data.
The checksum seed incompat feature has to be removed from the ignore
list if the support for metadata checksum verification is added to the
GRUB ext2 driver later.
Suggested-by: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The underlying type of 1ULL does not change across architectures but
grub_uint64_t does. This allows using the BF64_*CODE() macros as
arguments to format string functions that use the PRI* format string
macros that also vary with architecture.
Change the grub_error() call, where this was previously an issue and
temporarily fixed by casting and using a format string literal code,
to now use PRI* macros and remove casting.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The XFS now has an incompat feature flag to indicate that a filesystem
needs to be repaired. The Linux kernel refuses to mount the filesystem
that has it set and only the xfs_repair tool is able to clear that flag.
The GRUB doesn't have the concept of mounting filesystems and just
attempts to read the files. But it does some sanity checking before
attempting to read from the filesystem. Among the things which are tested,
is if the super block only has set of incompatible features flags that
are supported by GRUB. If it contains any flags that are not listed as
supported, reading the XFS filesystem fails.
Since the GRUB doesn't attempt to detect if the filesystem is inconsistent
nor replays the journal, the filesystem access is a best effort. For this
reason, ignore if the filesystem needs to be repaired and just print a debug
message. That way, if reading or booting fails later, the user is able to
figure out that the failures can be related to broken XFS filesystem.
Suggested-by: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The XFS filesystem supports a bigtime feature to overcome y2038 problem.
This patch makes the GRUB able to support the XFS filesystems with this
feature enabled.
The XFS counter for the bigtime enabled timestamps starts at 0, which
translates to GRUB_INT32_MIN (Dec 31 20:45:52 UTC 1901) in the legacy
timestamps. The conversion to Unix timestamps is made before passing the
value to other GRUB functions.
For this to work properly, GRUB requires an access to flags2 field in the
XFS ondisk inode. So, the grub_xfs_inode structure has been updated to
cover full ondisk inode.
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Some filesystems nowadays use 64-bit types for timestamps. So, update
grub_dirhook_info struct to use an grub_int64_t type to store mtime.
This also updates the grub_unixtime2datetime() function to receive
a 64-bit timestamp argument and do 64-bit-safe divisions.
All the remaining conversion from 32-bit to 64-bit should be safe, as
32-bit to 64-bit attributions will be implicitly casted. The most
critical part in the 32-bit to 64-bit conversion is in the function
grub_unixtime2datetime() where it needs to deal with the 64-bit type.
So, for that, the grub_divmod64() helper has been used.
These changes enables the GRUB to support dates beyond y2038.
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The ext2 (and ext3, ext4) filesystems write the number of free inodes to
location 0x410.
On a MINIX filesystem, that same location is used for the MINIX superblock
magic number.
If the number of free inodes on an ext2 filesystem is equal to any
of the four MINIX superblock magic values plus any multiple of 65536,
GRUB's MINIX filesystem code will probe it as a MINIX filesystem.
In the case of an OS using ext2 as the root filesystem, since there will
ordinarily be some amount of file creation and deletion on every bootup,
it effectively means that this situation has a 1:16384 chance of being hit
on every reboot.
This will cause GRUB's filesystem probing code to mistakenly identify an
ext2 filesystem as MINIX. This can be seen by e.g. "search --label"
incorrectly indicating that no such ext2 partition with matching label
exists, whereas in fact it does.
After spotting the rough cause of the issue I was facing here, I borrowed
much of the diagnosis/explanation from meierfra who found and investigated
the same issue in util-linux in 2010:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/util-linux/+bug/518582
This was fixed in util-linux by having the MINIX code check for the
ext2 magic. Do the same here.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com>
Reviewed-by: Derek Foreman <derek@endlessos.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This is a temporary, less-intrusive change to get the build to success with
compiler format string checking turned on. There is a better fix which
addresses this issue, but it needs more testing. Use this change so that
format string checking on grub_error() can be turned on until the better
change is fully tested.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
We encountered a file not found error when the symlink filesize is
equal to 60:
$ ls -l initrd
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 60 Jan 6 16:37 initrd -> secure-core-image-initramfs-5.10.2-yoctodev-standard.cpio.gz
When booting, we got the following error in the GRUB:
error: file `/initrd' not found
The root cause is that the size of diro->inode.symlink is equal to 60
and a symlink name has to be terminated with NUL there. So, if the
symlink filesize is exactly 60 then it is also stored in a separate
block rather than in the inode itself.
Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
We need to check errors before calling into a function that uses the result.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This prevents a divide by zero if nstripes == nparities, and
also prevents propagation of invalid values if nstripes ends up
less than nparities.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
We just introduced an error return in grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup().
Make sure the callers catch it.
At the same time, make sure that grub_nilfs2_btree_node_lookup() always
inits the index pointer passed to it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
NILFS2 reads the number of children a node has from the node. Unfortunately,
that's not trustworthy. Check if it's beyond what the filesystem permits and
reject it if so.
This blocks some OOB reads. I'm not sure how controllable the read is and what
could be done with invalidly read data later on.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
NILFS2 has up to 7 keys, per the data structure. Do not permit array
indices in excess of that.
This catches some OOB reads. I don't know how controllable the invalidly
read data is or if that could be used later in the program.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It's possible with a fuzzed filesystem for JFS to keep getblk()-ing
the same data over and over again, leading to stack exhaustion.
Check if we'd be calling the function with exactly the same data as
was passed in, and if so abort.
I'm not sure what the performance impact of this is and am open to
better ideas.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
getblk() implicitly trusts that treehead->count is an accurate count of
the number of extents. However, that value is read from disk and is not
trustworthy, leading to OOB reads and crashes. I am not sure to what
extent the data read from OOB can influence subsequent program execution.
Require callers to pass in the maximum number of extents for which
they have storage.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Fuzzing JFS revealed crashes where a negative number would be passed
to le_to_cpu16_copy(). There it would be cast to a large positive number
and the copy would read and write off the end of the respective buffers.
Catch this at the top as well as the bottom of the loop.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
