Previously, NV index mode only supported persistent handles which are
only for TPM objects.
On the other hand, the "NV index" handle allows the user-defined data,
so it can be an alternative to the key file and support TPM 2.0 Key
File format immediately.
The following tpm2-tools commands store the given key file, sealed.tpm,
in either TPM 2.0 Key File format or the raw format into the NV index
handle 0x1000000.
# tpm2_nvdefine -C o \
-a "ownerread|ownerwrite" \
-s $(stat -c %s sealed.tpm) \
0x1000000
# tpm2_nvwrite -C o -i sealed.tpm 0x1000000
To unseal the key in GRUB, add the "tpm2_key_protector_init" command to
grub.cfg:
tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x1000000
cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2
To remove the NV index handle:
# tpm2_nvundefine -C o 0x1000000
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Extract the logic to handle the file buffer from the SRK recover
function to prepare to load the sealed key from the NV index handle,
so the NV index mode can share the same code path in the later patch.
The SRK recover function now only reads the file and sends the file
buffer to the new function.
Besides this, to avoid introducing more options for the NV index mode,
the file format is detected automatically before unmarshaling the data,
so there is no need to use the command option to specify the file format
anymore. In other words, "-T" and "-k" are the same now.
Also update grub.text to address the change.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The user may need to inspect the TPM 2.0 PCR values with the GRUB shell,
so the new tpm2_dump_pcr command is added to print all PCRs of the
specified bank.
Also update the document for the new command.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
PCR mismatch is one common cause of TPM key unsealing fail. Since the
system may be compromised, it is not safe to boot into OS to get the PCR
values and TPM eventlog for the further investigation.
To provide some hints, GRUB now dumps PCRs on policy fail, so the user
can check the current PCR values. PCR 0~15 are chosen to cover the
firmware, bootloader, and OS.
The sample output:
PCR Mismatch! Check firmware and bootloader before typing passphrase!
TPM PCR [sha256]:
00: 17401f37710984c1d8a03a81fff3ab567ae9291bac61e21715b890ee28879738
01: 7a114329ba388445a96e8db2a072785937c1b7a8803ed7cc682b87f3ff3dd7a8
02: 11c2776849e8e24b7d80c926cbc4257871bffa744dadfefd3ed049ce25143e05
03: 6c33b362073e28e30b47302bbdd3e6f9cee4debca3a304e646f8c68245724350
04: 62d38838483ecfd2484ee3a2e5450d8ca3b35fc72cda6a8c620f9f43521c37d1
05: d8a85cb37221ab7d1f2cc5f554dbe0463acb6784b5b8dc3164ccaa66d8fff0e1
06: 9262e37cbe71ed4daf815b4a4881fb7251c9d371092dde827557d5368121e10e
07: 219d542233be492d62b079ffe46cf13396a8c27e520e88b08eaf2e6d3b7e70f5
08: de1f61c973b673e505adebe0d7e8fb65fde6c24dd4ab4fbaff9e28b18df6ecd3
09: c1de7274fa3e879a16d7e6e7629e3463d95f68adcfd17c477183846dccc41c89
10: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
11: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
12: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
13: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
14: 9ab9ebe4879a7f4dd00c04f37e79cfd69d0dd7a8bcc6b01135525b67676a3e40
15: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
16: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
17: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
18: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
19: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
20: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
21: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
22: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
23: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
error: failed to unseal sealed key (TPM2_Unseal: 0x99d).
error: no key protector provided a usable key for luks (af16e48f-746b-4a12-aae1-c14dcee429e0).
If the user happens to have the PCR values for key sealing, the PCR dump
can be used to identify the changed PCRs and narrow down the scope for
closer inspection.
Please note that the PCR dump is trustworthy only if the GRUB binary is
authentic, so the user has to check the GRUB binary thoroughly before
using the PCR dump.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Like the GNU ls, first print a line with the directory path before printing
files in the directory, which will not have a directory component, but only
if there is more than one argument.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
For arguments that are paths to files, print the full path of the file.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The modification time for paths to files was not being printed because
the grub_dirhook_info, which contains the mtime, was initialized to NULL.
Instead of calling print_file() directly, use fs->fs_dir() to call
print_file() with a properly filled in grub_dirhook_info. This has the
added benefit of reducing code complexity.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Simplify the code by removing logic around which file printer to call.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The pointer returned by grub_elf_file() is not checked to verify it is
not NULL before use. A NULL pointer may be returned when the given file
does not have a valid ELF header.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?61960
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Fink <lukas.fink1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
With the rest of module being blocked in lockdown mode it does not make
a lot of sense to leave memory reading enabled. This also goes in par
with disabling the dump command.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The dump enables a user to read memory which should not be possible
in lockdown mode.
Fixes: CVE-2025-1118
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reported-by: Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The test_parse() evaluates test expression recursively. Due to lack of
recursion depth check a specially crafted expression may cause a stack
overflow. The recursion is only triggered by the parentheses usage and
it can be unlimited. However, sensible expressions are unlikely to
contain more than a few parentheses. So, this patch limits the recursion
depth to 100, which should be sufficient.
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The grub_getline() function currently has a signed integer variable "i"
that can be overflown when user supplies more than 2^31 characters.
It results in a memory corruption of the allocated line buffer as well
as supplying large negative values to grub_realloc().
Fixes: CVE-2025-0690
Reported-by: Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bar Or <jonathanbaror@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
If the hooks are not removed they can be called after the module has
been unloaded leading to an use-after-free.
Fixes: CVE-2025-0622
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The grub_strrchr() may return NULL when the dirname do not contain "/".
This can happen on broken filesystems.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The grub_extcmd_dispatcher() calls grub_arg_list_alloc() to allocate
a grub_arg_list struct but it does not verify the allocation was successful.
In case of failed allocation the NULL state pointer can be accessed in
parse_option() through grub_arg_parse() which may lead to a security issue.
Fixes: CVE-2024-45775
Reported-by: Nils Langius <nils@langius.de>
Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen <lidong.chen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
It was possible to overflow the value of mod->ref_count, a signed
integer, by repeatedly invoking insmod on an already loaded module.
This led to a use-after-free. As once ref_count was overflowed it became
possible to unload the module while there was still references to it.
This resolves the issue by using grub_add() to check if the ref_count
will overflow and then stops further increments. Further changes were
also made to grub_dl_unref() to check for the underflow condition and
the reference count was changed to an unsigned 64-bit integer.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move tpm_get_tpm_version() into grub_ieee1275_tpm_init() and invalidate
grub_ieee1275_tpm_ihandle in case no TPM 2 could be detected. Try the
initialization only once so that grub_tpm_present() will always return
the same result. Use the grub_ieee1275_tpm_ihandle as indicator for an
available TPM instead of grub_ieee1275_tpm_version, which can now be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move common initialization functions from the ibmvtpm driver module into
tcg2.c that will be moved into the new TCG2 driver in a subsequent patch.
Make the functions available to the ibmvtpm driver as public functions
and variables.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Consolidate repeated definitions of IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID that are cast
to the type grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t. On the occasion add "GRUB_" prefix to
the constant name.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Currently with the TPM2 protector, only SRK mode is supported and
NV index support is just a stub. Implement the NV index option.
Note: This only extends support on the unseal path. grub-protect
has not been updated. tpm2-tools can be used to insert a key into
the NV index.
An example of inserting a key using tpm2-tools:
# Get random key.
tpm2_getrandom 32 > key.dat
# Create primary object.
tpm2_createprimary -C o -g sha256 -G ecc -c primary.ctx
# Create policy object. `pcrs.dat` contains the PCR values to seal against.
tpm2_startauthsession -S session.dat
tpm2_policypcr -S session.dat -l sha256:7,11 -f pcrs.dat -L policy.dat
tpm2_flushcontext session.dat
# Seal key into TPM.
cat key.dat | tpm2_create -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -L policy.dat -i-
tpm2_load -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -n sealing.name -c sealing.ctx
tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c sealing.ctx 0x81000000
Then to unseal the key in GRUB, add this to grub.cfg:
tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x81000000 --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2
Signed-off-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit handles the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize command from the key file
in TPM 2.0 Key File format.
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is the essential command to support authorized
policy which allows the users to sign TPM policies with their own keys.
Per TPM 2.0 Key File [1], CommandPolicy for TPM2_PolicyAuthorize
comprises "TPM2B_PUBLIC pubkey", "TPM2B_DIGEST policy_ref", and
"TPMT_SIGNATURE signature". To verify the signature, the current policy
digest is hashed with the hash algorithm written in "signature", and then
"signature" is verified with the hashed policy digest and "pubkey". Once
TPM accepts "signature", TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is invoked to authorize the
signed policy.
To create the key file with authorized policy, here are the pcr-oracle [2]
commands:
# Generate the RSA key and create the authorized policy file
$ pcr-oracle \
--rsa-generate-key \
--private-key policy-key.pem \
--auth authorized.policy \
create-authorized-policy 0,2,4,7,9
# Seal the secret with the authorized policy
$ pcr-oracle \
--key-format tpm2.0 \
--auth authorized.policy \
--input disk-secret.txt \
--output sealed.key \
seal-secret
# Sign the predicted PCR policy
$ pcr-oracle \
--key-format tpm2.0 \
--private-key policy-key.pem \
--from eventlog \
--stop-event "grub-file=grub.cfg" \
--after \
--input sealed.key \
--output /boot/efi/efi/grub/sealed.tpm \
sign 0,2,4,7,9
Then specify the key file and the key protector to grub.cfg in the EFI
system partition:
tpm2_key_protector_init -a RSA --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed.tpm
cryptomount -u <PART_UUID> -P tpm2
For any change in the boot components, just run the "sign" command again
to update the signature in sealed.tpm, and TPM can unseal the key file
with the updated PCR policy.
[1] https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html
[2] https://github.com/okirch/pcr-oracle
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval
of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0.
The theory of operation is such that the module accepts various
arguments, most of which are optional and therefore possess reasonable
defaults. One of these arguments is the keyfile/tpm2key parameter, which
is mandatory. There are two supported key formats:
1. Raw Sealed Key (--keyfile)
When sealing a key with TPM2_Create, the public portion of the sealed
key is stored in TPM2B_PUBLIC, and the private portion is in
TPM2B_PRIVATE. The raw sealed key glues the fully marshalled
TPM2B_PUBLIC and TPM2B_PRIVATE into one file.
2. TPM 2.0 Key (--tpm2key)
The following is the ASN.1 definition of TPM 2.0 Key File:
TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER
CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
}
TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
Name [0] EXPLICIT UTF8STRING OPTIONAL
Policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy
}
TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL
secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
authPolicy [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL
description [4] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL,
rsaParent [5] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
parent INTEGER
pubkey OCTET STRING
privkey OCTET STRING
}
The TPM2 key protector only expects a "sealed" key in DER encoding,
so "type" is always 2.23.133.10.1.5, "emptyAuth" is "TRUE", and
"secret" is empty. "policy" and "authPolicy" are the possible policy
command sequences to construct the policy digest to unseal the key.
Similar to the raw sealed key, the public portion (TPM2B_PUBLIC) of
the sealed key is stored in "pubkey", and the private portion
(TPM2B_PRIVATE) is in "privkey".
For more details: https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html
This sealed key file is created via the grub-protect tool. The tool
utilizes the TPM's sealing functionality to seal (i.e., encrypt) an
unlocking key using a Storage Root Key (SRK) to the values of various
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). These PCRs reflect the state
of the system as it boots. If the values are as expected, the system
may be considered trustworthy, at which point the TPM allows for a
caller to utilize the private component of the SRK to unseal (i.e.,
decrypt) the sealed key file. The caller, in this case, is this key
protector.
The TPM2 key protector registers two commands:
- tpm2_key_protector_init: Initializes the state of the TPM2 key
protector for later usage, clearing any
previous state, too, if any.
- tpm2_key_protector_clear: Clears any state set by tpm2_key_protector_init.
The way this is expected to be used requires the user to, either
interactively or, normally, via a boot script, initialize/configure
the key protector and then specify that it be used by the "cryptomount"
command (modifications to this command are in a different patch).
For instance, to unseal the raw sealed key file:
tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-1.key
cryptomount -u <PART1_UUID> -P tpm2
tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-2.key --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount -u <PART2_UUID> -P tpm2
Or, to unseal the TPM 2.0 Key file:
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-1.tpm
cryptomount -u <PART1_UUID> -P tpm2
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-2.tpm --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount -u <PART2_UUID> -P tpm2
If a user does not initialize the key protector and attempts to use it
anyway, the protector returns an error.
Before unsealing the key, the TPM2 key protector follows the "TPMPolicy"
sequences to enforce the TPM policy commands to construct a valid policy
digest to unseal the key.
For the TPM 2.0 Key files, "authPolicy" may contain multiple "TPMPolicy"
sequences, the TPM2 key protector iterates "authPolicy" to find a valid
sequence to unseal key. If "authPolicy" is empty or all sequences in
"authPolicy" fail, the protector tries the one from "policy". In case
"policy" is also empty, the protector creates a "TPMPolicy" sequence
based on the given PCR selection.
For the raw sealed key, the TPM2 key protector treats the key file as a
TPM 2.0 Key file without "authPolicy" and "policy", so the "TPMPolicy"
sequence is always based on the PCR selection from the command
parameters.
This commit only supports one policy command: TPM2_PolicyPCR. The
command set will be extended to support advanced features, such as
authorized policy, in the later commits.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Currently rdmsr and wrmsr commands have own MSR support detection code.
This code is the same. So, it is duplicated. Additionally, this code
cannot be reused by others. Hence, extract this code to a function and
make it public. By the way, improve a code a bit.
Additionally, use GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE instead of GRUB_ERR_BUG to signal
an error because errors encountered by this new routine are not bugs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Use more obvious names which match corresponding instructions:
* grub_msr_read() => grub_rdmsr(),
* grub_msr_write() => grub_wrmsr().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It does not make sense to have separate headers for individual static
functions. So, make one common place to store them.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The loopback image is configured to function as a disk by being mapped
as a block device. Instead of measuring the entire block device we
should focus on tracking the individual files accessed from it. For
example, we do not directly measure block devices like hd0 disk but the
files opened from it.
This method is important to avoid running out of memory since loopback
images can be very large. Trying to read and measure the whole image at
once could cause out of memory errors and disrupt the boot process.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The get_part_uuid() function made an assumption that the target GRUB
device is a partition device and accessed device->disk->partition
without checking for NULL. There are four situations where this
assumption is problematic:
1. The device is a net device instead of a disk.
2. The device is an abstraction device, like LVM, RAID, or CRYPTO, which
is mostly logical "disk" ((lvmid/<UUID>) and so on).
3. Firmware RAID may present the ESP to GRUB as an EFI disk (hd0) device
if it is contained within a Linux software RAID.
4. When booting from a CD-ROM, the ESP is a VFAT image indexed by the El
Torito boot catalog. The boot device is set to (cd0), corresponding
to the CD-ROM image mounted as an ISO 9660 filesystem.
As a result, get_part_uuid() could lead to a NULL pointer dereference
and trigger a synchronous exception during boot if the ESP falls into
one of these categories. This patch fixes the problem by adding the
necessary checks to handle cases where the ESP is not a partition device.
Additionally, to avoid disrupting the boot process, this patch relaxes
the severity of the errors in this context to non-critical. Errors will
be logged, but they will not prevent the boot process from continuing.
Fixes: e0fa7dc84 (bli: Add a module for the Boot Loader Interface)
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-By: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The measurements for confidential computing has been introduced in the
commit 4c76565b6 (efi/tpm: Add EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL support).
Recently the patch 30708dfe3 (tpm: Disable the tpm verifier if the TPM
device is not present) has been introduced to optimize the memory usage
when a TPM device is not available on platforms. This fix prevents the
tpm module to be loaded on confidential computing platforms, e.g. Intel
machines with TDX enabled, where the TPM device is not available.
In this patch, we propose to load the tpm module for this use case by
generalizing the tpm feature detection in order to cover CC platforms.
Basically, we do it by detecting the availability of the
EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL EFI protocol.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?65821
Fixes: 30708dfe3 (tpm: Disable the tpm verifier if the TPM device is not present)
Signed-off-by: Hector Cao <hector.cao@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
The CMOS actually exists on most EFI platforms and in some cases is used to
store useful data that makes it justifiable for GRUB to read/write it.
As for date and time keep using EFI API and not CMOS one.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
According to the ACPI specification the XSDT Entry field contains an array
of 64-bit physical addresses which points to other DESCRIPTION_HEADERs. However,
the entry_ptr iterator is defined as a 32-bit pointer. It means each 64-bit
entry in the XSDT table is treated as two separate 32-bit entries then. Fix the
issue by using correct addresses sizes when processing RSDT and XSDT tables.
Signed-off-by: Qiumiao Zhang <zhangqiumiao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
On ia64 alignment requirements are strict. When we pass a pointer to
UUID it needs to be at least 4-byte aligned or EFI will crash.
On the other hand in device path there is no padding for UUID, so we
need 2 types in one formor another. Make 4-byte aligned and unaligned types
The code is structured in a way to accept unaligned inputs
in most cases and supply 4-byte aligned outputs.
Efiemu case is a bit ugly because there inputs and outputs are
reversed and so we need careful casts to account for this
inversion.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
We do table search in many places doing exactly the same algorithm.
The only minor variance in users is which table is used if several entries
are present. As specification mandates uniqueness and even if it ever isn't,
first entry is good enough, unify this code and always use the first entry.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
known_protocols isn't used anywhere else and even misses grub_ prefix, so
let's make it local (static).
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
E.g. 2.10 instead of 00020064 and 2.3.1 instead of 0002001f.
See UEFI 2.10 specification, chapter 4.2.1 EFI_TABLE_HEADER.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In long list mode, if the file can not be opened, the file is not printed.
Instead, print the file but print the size as "????????????".
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
For each non-directory path argument to the ls command, the full path was
being sent to the print functions, instead of the dirname. The long output
print function expected dirname to be the directory containing the file
and so could not open the file to get the file size because the generated
path was incorrect. This caused the output to be a blank line.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The videoinfo command will initialize all non-active video adapters. Video
drivers tend to zero out the global framebuffer object on initialization.
This is not a problem when there is no active video adapter. However, when
there is, then outputting to the video adapter will cause a crash because
methods in the framebuffer object are reinitialized. For example, this
command sequence will cause a crash.
terminal_output --append gfxterm; videoinfo
When running in a QEMU headless with GRUB built for the x86_64-efi target,
the first command initializes the Bochs video adapter, which, among
other things, sets the set_page() member function. Then when videoinfo is
run, all non-Bochs video adapters will be initialized, each one wiping
the framebuffer and thus setting set_page to NULL. Soon after the videoinfo
command finishes there will be a call to grub_refresh(), which will
ultimately call the framebuffer's set_page which will be NULL and cause
a crash when called.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Currently booting the system is prevented when call to EFI firmware
hash_log_extend_event() returns unknown error. Solve this by following
convention used in commit a4356538d (commands/tpm: Don't propagate
measurement failures to the verifiers layer).
Let the system to be bootable by default when unknown TPM error is
encountered. Check environment variable tpm_fail_fatal to fallback to
previous behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Michał Grzelak <mchl.grzlk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
According to the ACPI specification, in ACPI 2.0 or later, an
ACPI-compatible OS must use the XSDT if present. So, we should
use xsdt_addr instead of rsdt_addr if xsdt_addr is valid.
Signed-off-by: Qiumiao Zhang <zhangqiumiao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add a new module named bli. It implements a small but quite useful part
of the Boot Loader Interface [0]. This interface uses EFI variables for
communication between the boot loader and the operating system.
When loaded, this module sets two EFI variables under the vendor GUID
4a67b082-0a4c-41cf-b6c7-440b29bb8c4f:
- LoaderInfo: contains GRUB + <version number>.
This allows the running operating system to identify the boot loader
used during boot.
- LoaderDevicePartUUID: contains the partition UUID of the EFI System
Partition (ESP). This is used by systemd-gpt-auto-generator [1] to
find the root partitions (and others too), via partition type IDs [2].
This module is available on EFI platforms only. The bli module relies on
the part_gpt module which has to be loaded beforehand to make the GPT
partitions discoverable.
Update the documentation, add a new chapter "Modules" and describe the
bli module there.
[0] https://systemd.io/BOOT_LOADER_INTERFACE/
[1] https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-gpt-auto-generator.html
[2] https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/discoverable_partitions_specification/
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Use the new printf format specifier %pG.
Fixes the text representation of GUIDs in the output of the lsefisystab
command (missing 4th dash).
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
There are 3 implementations of a GUID in GRUB. Replace them with
a common one, placed in types.h.
It uses the "packed" flavor of the GUID structs, the alignment attribute
is dropped, since it is not required.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Steffen <osteffen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Now that GCC can generate function calls using the correct calling
convention for us, we can stop using the efi_call_XX() wrappers, and
just dereference the function pointers directly.
This avoids the untyped variadic wrapper routines, which means better
type checking for the method calls.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
