Signing GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a
bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch
so document it here.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Before adding information about how GRUB is signed with an appended
signature scheme, it's worth adding some information about how it
can currently be signed for UEFI.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
These tests are run through all_functional_test and test a range
of commands and behaviours.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage certificate/binary
hashes.
1. append_list_dbx:
Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate
hashes from the dbx list.
2. append_add_db_hash:
Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
3. append_add_dbx_hash:
Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.
Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signatures) is set to yes,
the append_add_db_hash and append_add_dbx_hash commands only accept the file
‘hash_file’ that is signed with an appended signature.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Introducing the following GRUB commands to manage the certificates.
1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3. append_add_dbx_cert:
Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list
4. append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list
Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signatures) is set to yes,
the append_add_db_cert and append_add_dbx_cert commands only accept the file
‘X509_certificate’ that is signed with an appended signature.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sridhar Markonda <sridharm@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signature verification: verify the kernel against lists of hashes that are
either in dbx or db list. If it is not in the dbx list then the trusted keys
from the db list are used to verify the signature.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
If secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted
certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list.
If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted
certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS
and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash
are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists usage is
added by a subsequent patch.
Note:
- If db does not exist in the PKS storage, then read the static keys as a db
default keys from the GRUB ELF Note and add them into the db list.
- If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then do not
add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Introducing the appended signature key management environment variable. It is
automatically set to either "static" or "dynamic" based on the Platform KeyStore.
"static": Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the
default. When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value
by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic".
"dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB
is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the
appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static".
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature,
which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables
from PKS.
If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx
from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be
saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would
read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.
In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
Note:
SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well
as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended
signatures.
This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and
GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
Signature verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures.
If secure boot is enabled with enforce mode when the appendedsig module is
loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted keys will be
extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and locked automatically.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Read secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and if the secure boot
mode is set to 2 (enforce), enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled.
There are three secure boot modes. They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails,
display the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforce
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and if signature
verification fails, display the errors and stop the boot.
Now, only support disabled and enforce.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This code allows us to parse:
- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7
messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf
certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.
- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by
verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> # EKU support
Reported-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.com> # key usage issue
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This code allows us to parse:
- PKCS#7 signed data messages. Only a single signer info is supported, which
is all that the Linux sign-file utility supports creating out-of-the-box.
Only RSA, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are supported. Any certificate embedded in
the PKCS#7 message will be ignored.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This code allows us to parse ASN1 node and allocating memory to store it.
It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
- Integers
- Octet strings
- DER encoding of other structures
It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
- Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
- Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In order to parse PKCS#7 messages and X.509 certificates with libtasn1, we need
some information about how they are encoded. We get these from GNUTLS, which has
the benefit that they support the features we need and are well tested.
The GNUTLS files are from:
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn
The GNUTLS license is LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3 compatible, allowing us to import
it without issue.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
To support verification of appended signatures, we need a way to embed the
necessary public keys. Existing appended signature schemes in the Linux kernel
use X.509 certificates, so allow certificates to be embedded in the GRUB core
image in the same way as PGP keys.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Prior to the addition of the X.509 public key support for appended signature,
current PGP signature relied on the GPG public key. Changing the enum name
from "OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY" to "OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY" to differentiate between x509
certificate based appended signature and GPG certificate based PGP signature.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The way gcry_rsa and friends (the asymmetric ciphers) are loaded for the
pgp module is a bit quirky.
include/grub/crypto.h contains:
extern struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
commands/pgp.c contains the actual storage:
struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
And the module itself saves to the storage in pgp.c:
GRUB_MOD_INIT(gcry_rsa)
{
grub_crypto_pk_rsa = &_gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;
}
This is annoying: gcry_rsa now has a dependency on pgp!
We want to be able to bring in gcry_rsa without bringing in PGP, so move the
storage to crypto.c.
Previously, gcry_rsa depended on pgp and mpi. Now it depends on crypto and mpi.
As pgp depends on crypto, this doesn't add any new module dependencies using
the PGP verfier.
[FWIW, the story is different for the symmetric ciphers. cryptodisk and friends
(zfs encryption etc) use grub_crypto_lookup_cipher_by_name() to get a cipher
handle. That depends on grub_ciphers being populated by people calling
grub_cipher_register. import_gcry.py ensures that the symmetric ciphers call it.]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add infrastructure to allow firmware to verify the integrity of GRUB
by use of a Linux-kernel-module-style appended signature. We initially
target powerpc-ieee1275, but the code should be extensible to other
platforms.
Usually these signatures are appended to a file without modifying the
ELF file itself. (This is what the 'sign-file' tool does, for example.)
The verifier loads the signed file from the file system and looks at the
end of the file for the appended signature. However, on powerpc-ieee1275
platforms, the bootloader is often stored directly in the PReP partition
as raw bytes without a file-system. This makes determining the location
of an appended signature more difficult.
To address this, we add a new ELF Note.
The name field of shall be the string "Appended-Signature", zero-padded
to 4 byte alignment. The type field shall be 0x41536967 (the ASCII values
for the string "ASig"). It must be the final section in the ELF binary.
The description shall contain the appended signature structure as defined
by the Linux kernel. The description will also be padded to be a multiple
of 4 bytes. The padding shall be added before the appended signature
structure (not at the end) so that the final bytes of a signed ELF file
are the appended signature magic.
A subsequent patch documents how to create a GRUB core.img validly signed
under this scheme.
Signed-off-by: Rashmica Gupta <rashmica.g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avnish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
On some targets, size_t and grub_size_t may not be the same type
(unsigned long / unsigned int). This breaks the compilation because the
definition of _gpgrt_b64dec_proc() differs from gpgrt_b64dec_proc()
declaration. Fix it by using grub_size_t in the _gpgrt_b64dec_proc()
definition.
Signed-off-by: Anaëlle Cazuc <acazuc@acazuc.fr>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
When using grub-mkrescue for a riscv32 target, an invalid implicit cast
on the offset calculation produces an error during the relocation process:
grub-mkrescue: error: target XXX not reachable from pc=fc.
This patch adds an explicit grub_int64_t cast to compute the offset
as a 64-bit subtraction.
Signed-off-by: Anaëlle Cazuc <acazuc@acazuc.fr>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Attempts to build GRUB with Clang were failing due to errors such as:
error: redefinition of typedef 'gcry_md_hd_t' is a C11 feature
Correct this by adding a compiler pragma to disable the Clang
"typedef-redefinition" warnings. This required an update to
include/grub/crypto.h and the util/import_gcry.py script to add the
pragma to libgcrypt-grub's types.h due to u16 and similar types.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add test ISO files to dist package to allow ISO test to pass.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add tests outside the date range possible with 32-bit time calculation.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Update the bootstrap script to be compatible with newer versions of git
that changed the "git clone -h" output from containing:
--depth
to:
--[no-]depth
This bootstrap script is pulled the latest gnulib version from gnulib
git, commit 9a1a6385 (Silence 'time-stamp' warnings with bleeding-edge
Emacs.). This change avoids a full clone on gnulib, saving something
like 50 MB.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?66357
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Correct some outdated links to various websites and change
http to https in a few places.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Update the Future section of the GRUB manual to reflect
current work on the 2.x series.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add documentation for new libgcrypt modules imported into GRUB.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Update chapter name from "Outline" to "Platform-specific operations" to
improve readability. Also slightly improve some wording in this section.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Update the BUGS file to just point to the GRUB bug tracking system.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Update INSTALL documentation to note that the optional grub-protect
utility requires libtasn1 to build.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Gettext 0.26 validates format strings. In some cases before
the GRUB build process was converting newlines sequences (\n)
to (\<translated character>) which is invalid. Update the
impacted language sed script files to ensure newlines use
the correct escape sequence.
This avoids build errors such as:
de@hebrew.po:8192: 'msgstr' is not a valid Shell printf format string, unlike 'msgid'. Reason: This escape sequence is invalid.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?67353
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Some Qualcomm-based UEFI platforms only provide volume up, volume down,
and power keys. The volume keys are already mapped to SCAN_UP and SCAN_DOWN,
while the power key is mapped to SCAN_SUSPEND (key.scan_code 0x0102).
On such devices, the power key is commonly used as the Enter (confirm)
button, since no dedicated Enter key exists. This patch treats key.scan_code
0x0102 as Enter to improve usability on these platforms.
Signed-off-by: Kancy Joe <kancy2333@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This is a typo that was stopping this bash-completion from being installed.
Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
A Unified Kernel Image (UKI) is a single UEFI PE file that combines
a UEFI boot stub, a Linux kernel image, an initrd, and further resources.
The uki command will locate where the UKI file is and create a GRUB menu
entry to load it.
The Unified Kernel Image Specification: https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/unified_kernel_image/
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Irritatingly, BLS defines paths relative to the mountpoint of the
filesystem which contains its snippets, not / or any other fixed
location. So grub-emu needs to know whether /boot is a separate
filesystem from / and conditionally prepend a path.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Adding filevercmp support to grub-core/commands/blsuki.c from gnulib will cause
issues with the type of the offset parameter for grub_util_write_image_at() for
emu builds. To fix this issue, we can change the type from off_t to grub_off_t.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The BootLoaderSpec (BLS) defines a scheme where different bootloaders can
share a format for boot items and a configuration directory that accepts
these common configurations as drop-in files.
The BLS Specification: https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/boot_loader_specification/
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Thompson <wjt@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add the functions grub_strtok() and grub_strtok_r() to help parse strings into
tokens separated by characters in the "delim" parameter. These functions are
present in gnulib but calling them directly from the gnulib code is quite
challenging since the call "#include <string.h>" would include the header file
grub-core/lib/posix_wrap/string.h instead of grub-core/lib/gnulib/string.h,
where strtok() and strtok_r() are declared. Since this overlap is quite
problematic, the simpler solution was to implement the code in the GRUB based
on gnulib's implementation. For more information on these functions, visit the
Linux Programmer's Manual, man strtok.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Xen traditionally allows customizing guest behavior by passing arguments
to the VM kernel via the kernel command line. This is no longer possible
when using GRUB with Xen, as the kernel command line is decided by the
GRUB configuration file within the guest, not data passed to the guest
by Xen.
To work around this limitation, enable GRUB to parse a command line
passed to it by Xen, and expose data from the command line to the GRUB
configuration as environment variables. These variables can be used in
the GRUB configuration for any desired purpose, such as extending the
kernel command line passed to the guest. The command line format is
inspired by the Linux kernel's command line format.
To reduce the risk of misuse, abuse, or accidents in production, the
command line will only be parsed if it consists entirely of 7-bit ASCII
characters, only alphabetical characters and underscores are permitted
in variable names, and all variable names must start with the string
"xen_grub_env_". This also allows room for expanding the command line
arguments accepted by GRUB in the future, should other arguments end up
becoming desirable in the future.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Rainbolt <arraybolt3@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The cmd_line field of the start_info struct is not guaranteed to be
NUL-terminated, even though it is intended to contain a NUL-terminated
string. Add a warning about this in a comment so future consumers of
this field know to check it for a NUL terminator before using it.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Rainbolt <arraybolt3@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
When grub-probe fails, the current code is to just stuff an empty result
in which causes the user to not knowingly have a system that no longer
boots. grub-probe can fail because the ZFS pool that contains the root
filesystem might have features that GRUB does not yet support which is
a common configuration for people with a rpool and a bpool. This behavior
uses the zdb utility to dump the same value as the filesystem label
would print.
Signed-off-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
We need to avoid clobbering existing table between starting of chunk movers
and the moment we install target page table. Generate temporary table for
this rather than hoping that we don't clobber existing one.
Fixes 64-bit GhostBSD on 64-bit EFI.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Some of our paths are too long for tar-v7 at this point but tar-ustar
is supported by essentially everything. So, let's use that.
Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
These files were not added to EXTRA_DISTS during the libgcrypt
and libtasn1 imports but are required for autogen.sh to work.
Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This new file was not added to the distribution tarball during the last
libgcrypt import.
Fixes: 0739d24cd164 (libgcrypt: Adjust import script, definitions and API users for libgcrypt 1.11)
Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The include/xen/xen.h header was using an overly generic name to refer
to the maximum length of the command line passed from Xen to a guest.
Rename it to avoid confusion or conflicts in the future.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Rainbolt <arraybolt3@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The cmdline_size already account for NUL terminator, you can see
this in xen_boot_binary_load(). The same property is set correctly
for Xen command line.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@cloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
From UEFI specifications 2.10, section 13.2.2, EFI_LOAD_FILE2_PROTOCOL.LoadFile
(see https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/13_Protocols_Media_Access.html), for BufferSize:
On input the size of Buffer in bytes. On output with a return code
of EFI_SUCCESS, the amount of data transferred to Buffer. On output
with a return code of EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, the size of Buffer
required to retrieve the requested file.
So, set *buffer_size correctly.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@cloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
