The canary, __stack_chk_guard, is in the BSS and so will get initialized to zero if it is not explicitly initialized. If the UEFI firmware does not support the RNG protocol, then the canary will not be randomized and will be zero. This seems like a possibly easier value to write by an attacker. Initialize canary to static random bytes, so that it is still random when there is no RNG protocol. Set at least one byte to NUL to protect against string buffer overflow attacks [1]. Code that writes NUL terminated strings will terminate when a NUL is encountered in the input byte stream. So the attacker will not be able to forge the canary by including it in the input stream without terminating the string operation and thus limiting the stack corruption. [1] https://www.sans.org/blog/stack-canaries-gingerly-sidestepping-the-cage/ Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
172 lines
4.4 KiB
C
172 lines
4.4 KiB
C
/* init.c - generic EFI initialization and finalization */
|
|
/*
|
|
* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2006,2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
|
*
|
|
* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
|
|
* (at your option) any later version.
|
|
*
|
|
* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
*
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
|
|
#include <grub/efi/console.h>
|
|
#include <grub/efi/debug.h>
|
|
#include <grub/efi/disk.h>
|
|
#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
|
|
#include <grub/lockdown.h>
|
|
#include <grub/term.h>
|
|
#include <grub/misc.h>
|
|
#include <grub/env.h>
|
|
#include <grub/mm.h>
|
|
#include <grub/kernel.h>
|
|
#include <grub/stack_protector.h>
|
|
|
|
#ifdef GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR
|
|
|
|
static grub_efi_char16_t stack_chk_fail_msg[] =
|
|
L"* GRUB: STACK SMASHING DETECTED!!! *\r\n"
|
|
L"* GRUB: ABORTED!!! *\r\n"
|
|
L"* GRUB: REBOOTING IN 5 SECONDS... *\r\n";
|
|
|
|
static grub_guid_t rng_protocol_guid = GRUB_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't put this on grub_efi_init()'s local stack to avoid it
|
|
* getting a stack check.
|
|
*/
|
|
static grub_efi_uint8_t stack_chk_guard_buf[32];
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize canary in case there is no RNG protocol. */
|
|
grub_addr_t __stack_chk_guard = (grub_addr_t) 0x00f2b7e2f193b25c;
|
|
|
|
void __attribute__ ((noreturn))
|
|
__stack_chk_fail (void)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_efi_simple_text_output_interface_t *o;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use ConOut here rather than StdErr. StdErr only goes to
|
|
* the serial console, at least on EDK2.
|
|
*/
|
|
o = grub_efi_system_table->con_out;
|
|
o->output_string (o, stack_chk_fail_msg);
|
|
|
|
grub_efi_system_table->boot_services->stall (5000000);
|
|
grub_efi_system_table->runtime_services->reset_system (GRUB_EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN,
|
|
GRUB_EFI_ABORTED, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We shouldn't get here. It's unsafe to return because the stack
|
|
* is compromised and this function is noreturn, so just busy
|
|
* loop forever.
|
|
*/
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
/* Do not optimize out the loop. */
|
|
asm volatile ("");
|
|
}
|
|
while (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
stack_protector_init (void)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_efi_rng_protocol_t *rng;
|
|
|
|
/* Set up the stack canary. Make errors here non-fatal for now. */
|
|
rng = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&rng_protocol_guid, NULL);
|
|
if (rng != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_efi_status_t status;
|
|
|
|
status = rng->get_rng (rng, NULL, sizeof (stack_chk_guard_buf),
|
|
stack_chk_guard_buf);
|
|
if (status == GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
|
|
grub_memcpy (&__stack_chk_guard, stack_chk_guard_buf, sizeof (__stack_chk_guard));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
static void
|
|
stack_protector_init (void)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
grub_addr_t grub_modbase;
|
|
|
|
__attribute__ ((__optimize__ ("-fno-stack-protector"))) void
|
|
grub_efi_init (void)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_modbase = grub_efi_section_addr ("mods");
|
|
/* First of all, initialize the console so that GRUB can display
|
|
messages. */
|
|
grub_console_init ();
|
|
|
|
stack_protector_init ();
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the memory management system. */
|
|
grub_efi_mm_init ();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Lockdown the GRUB and register the shim_lock verifier
|
|
* if the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_lockdown ();
|
|
grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup ();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
grub_efi_system_table->boot_services->set_watchdog_timer (0, 0, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
grub_efidisk_init ();
|
|
|
|
grub_efi_register_debug_commands ();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void (*grub_efi_net_config) (grub_efi_handle_t hnd,
|
|
char **device,
|
|
char **path);
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
grub_machine_get_bootlocation (char **device, char **path)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_efi_loaded_image_t *image = NULL;
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
image = grub_efi_get_loaded_image (grub_efi_image_handle);
|
|
if (!image)
|
|
return;
|
|
*device = grub_efidisk_get_device_name (image->device_handle);
|
|
if (!*device && grub_efi_net_config)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_efi_net_config (image->device_handle, device, path);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*path = grub_efi_get_filename (image->file_path);
|
|
if (*path)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Get the directory. */
|
|
p = grub_strrchr (*path, '/');
|
|
if (p)
|
|
*p = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
grub_efi_fini (void)
|
|
{
|
|
grub_efidisk_fini ();
|
|
grub_console_fini ();
|
|
}
|