This patch is used to fix GRUB menu gets stuck in server AC
poweron/poweroff stress test of x86_64, which is reproduced with
1/200 ratio. The root cause analysis as below:
Q: What's the code logic?
A: The grub_tsc_init() function will init tsc by setting grub_tsc_rate,
which call stack is:
grub_tsc_init() -> grub_tsc_calibrate_from_pmtimer() -> grub_divmod64()
Among, grub_divmod64() function needs tsc_diff as the second parameter.
In grub_pmtimer_wait_count_tsc(), we will call grub_get_tsc() function
to get time stamp counter value to assign to start_tsc variable, and
get into while (1) loop space to get end_tsc variable value with same
function, after 3580 ticks, return "end_tsc - start_tsc". Actually,
rdtsc instruction will be called in grub_get_tsc, but rdtsc instruction
is not reliable (for the reason see the next question), which will cause
tsc_diff to be a very big number larger than (1UL << 32) or a negative
number, so that grub_tsc_rate will be zero. When run_menu() function is
startup, and calls grub_tsc_get_time_ms() function to get current time
to check if timeout time reach, at this time, grub_tsc_get_time_ms()
function will return zero due to zero grub_tsc_rate variable, then GRUB
menu gets stuck...
Q: What's the difference between rdtsc and rdtscp instructions in x86_64
architecture? Here is more explanations from Intel® 64 and IA-32
Architectures Software Developer’s Manual Volume 2B (December 2024):
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671241
A: In page 4-558 -> RDTSC—Read Time-Stamp Counter:
The RDTSC instruction is not a serializing instruction. It does not
necessarily wait until all previous instructions have been executed
before reading the counter. Similarly, subsequent instructions may
begin execution before the read operation is performed. The following
items may guide software seeking to order executions of RDTSC:
- If software requires RDTSC to be executed only after all previous
instructions have executed and all previous loads are globally
visible, it can execute LFENCE immediately before RDTSC.
- If software requires RDTSC to be executed only after all previous
instructions have executed and all previous loads and stores are
globally visible, it can execute the sequence MFENCE;LFENCE
immediately before RDTSC.
- If software requires RDTSC to be executed prior to execution of any
subsequent instruction (including any memory accesses), it can execute
the sequence LFENCE immediately after RDTSC.
A: In page 4-560 -> RDTSCP—Read Time-Stamp Counter and Processor ID:
The RDTSCP instruction is not a serializing instruction, but it does wait
until all previous instructions have executed and all previous loads are
globally visible. But it does not wait for previous stores to be globally
visible, and subsequent instructions may begin execution before the read
operation is performed. The following items may guide software seeking to
order executions of RDTSCP:
- If software requires RDTSCP to be executed only after all previous
stores are globally visible, it can execute MFENCE immediately before
RDTSCP.
- If software requires RDTSCP to be executed prior to execution of any
subsequent instruction (including any memory accesses), it can execute
LFENCE immediately after RDTSCP.
Q: Why there is a cpuid serializing instruction before rdtsc instruction,
but "grub_get_tsc" still cannot work as expect?
A: From Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual
Volume 2A: Instruction Set Reference, A-L (December 2024):
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671199
In page 3-222 -> CPUID—CPU Identification:
CPUID can be executed at any privilege level to serialize instruction execution.
Serializing instruction execution guarantees that any modifications to flags,
registers, and memory for previous instructions are completed before
the next instruction is fetched and executed.
So we only kept the instruction rdtsc and its previous instruction in order
currently. But it is still out-of-order possibility between rdtsc instruction
and its subsequent instruction.
Q: Why do we do this fix?
A: In the one hand, add cpuid instruction after rdtsc instruction to make sure
rdtsc instruction to be executed prior to execution of any subsequent instruction,
about serializing execution that all previous instructions have been executed
before rdtsc, there is a cpuid usage in original code. In the other hand, using
cpuid instruction rather than lfence can make sure a forward compatibility for
previous HW.
Base this fix, we did 1500 cycles power on/off stress test, and did not reproduce
this issue again.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?66257
Signed-off-by: Duan Yayong <duanyayong@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Yongqiang <liyongqiang@huaqin.com>
Signed-off-by: Sun Ming <simon.sun@huaqin.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It was possible to overflow the value of mod->ref_count, a signed
integer, by repeatedly invoking insmod on an already loaded module.
This led to a use-after-free. As once ref_count was overflowed it became
possible to unload the module while there was still references to it.
This resolves the issue by using grub_add() to check if the ref_count
will overflow and then stops further increments. Further changes were
also made to grub_dl_unref() to check for the underflow condition and
the reference count was changed to an unsigned 64-bit integer.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The function included a call to grub_strcpy() which copied data from an
environment variable to a buffer allocated in grub_cmd_normal(). The
grub_cmd_normal() didn't consider the length of the environment variable.
So, the copy operation could exceed the allocation and lead to an OOB
write. Fix the issue by replacing grub_strcpy() with grub_strlcpy() and
pass the underlying buffers size to the grub_net_search_config_file().
Fixes: CVE-2025-0624
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister(), previously
implemented in a header, did not remove the variables hooks that
were registered in grub_net_network_level_interface_register().
Fix this by implementing the same logic used to register the
variables and move the function into the grub-core/net/net.c.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The grub_disk_read() may trigger other disk reads, e.g. via loopbacks.
This may lead to very deep recursion which can corrupt the heap. So, fix
the issue by limiting reads depth.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It was possible to delete a loopback while there were still references
to it. This led to an exploitable use-after-free.
Fixed by implementing a reference counting in the grub_loopback struct.
Reported-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The GRUB may use TPM to verify the integrity of boot components and the
result can determine whether a previously sealed key can be released. If
everything checks out, showing nothing has been tampered with, the key
is released and GRUB unlocks the encrypted root partition for the next
stage of booting.
However, the liberal Command Line Interface (CLI) can be misused by
anyone in this case to access files in the encrypted partition one way
or another. Despite efforts to keep the CLI secure by preventing utility
command output from leaking file content, many techniques in the wild
could still be used to exploit the CLI, enabling attacks or learning
methods to attack. It's nearly impossible to account for all scenarios
where a hack could be applied.
Therefore, to mitigate potential misuse of the CLI after the root device
has been successfully unlocked via TPM, the user should be required to
authenticate using the LUKS password. This added layer of security
ensures that only authorized users can access the CLI reducing the risk
of exploitation or unauthorized access to the encrypted partition.
Fixes: CVE-2024-49504
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The grub_file_open() and grub_file_close() should be the only places
that allow a reference to a filesystem to stay open. So, add grub_dl_t
to grub_fs_t and set this in the GRUB_MOD_INIT() for each filesystem to
avoid issues when filesystems forget to do it themselves or do not track
their own references, e.g. squash4.
The fs_label(), fs_uuid(), fs_mtime() and fs_read() should all ref and
unref in the same function but it is essentially redundant in GRUB
single threaded model.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It was possible to read OOB when an attribute had a size that exceeded
the allocated buffer. This resolves that by making sure all attributes
that get read are fully in the allocated space by implementing
a function to validate them.
Defining the offsets in include/grub/ntfs.h but they are only used in
the validation function and not across the rest of the NTFS code.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Right now to access the next attribute the code reads the length of the
current attribute and adds that to the current pointer. This is error
prone as bounds checking needs to be performed all over the place. So,
implement a helper and ensure its used across find_attr() and read_attr().
This commit does *not* implement full bounds checking. It is just the
preparation work for this to be added into the helper.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The end of the attribute buffer should be stored alongside the rest of
the attribute struct as right now it is not possible to implement bounds
checking when accessing attributes sequentially.
This is done via:
- updating init_attr() to set at->end and check is is not initially out of bounds,
- implementing checks as init_attr() had its type change in its callers,
- updating the value of at->end when needed.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
grub_strlcpy() acts the same way as strlcpy() does on most *NIX,
returning the length of src and ensuring dest is always NUL
terminated except when size is 0.
Signed-off-by: B Horn <b@horn.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move tpm_get_tpm_version() into grub_ieee1275_tpm_init() and invalidate
grub_ieee1275_tpm_ihandle in case no TPM 2 could be detected. Try the
initialization only once so that grub_tpm_present() will always return
the same result. Use the grub_ieee1275_tpm_ihandle as indicator for an
available TPM instead of grub_ieee1275_tpm_version, which can now be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move common initialization functions from the ibmvtpm driver module into
tcg2.c that will be moved into the new TCG2 driver in a subsequent patch.
Make the functions available to the ibmvtpm driver as public functions
and variables.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Consolidate repeated definitions of IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID that are cast
to the type grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t. On the occasion add "GRUB_" prefix to
the constant name.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
As a preparation to test tpm2_key_protector with grub-emu, the new
option, --tpm-device, is introduced to specify the TPM device for
grub-emu so that grub-emu can access an emulated TPM device from
the host.
Since grub-emu can directly access the device on host, it's easy to
implement the essential TCG2 command submission function with the
read/write functions and enable tpm2_key_protector module for grub-emu,
so that we can further test TPM2 key unsealing with grub-emu.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Add a new parameter to cryptomount to support the key protectors framework: -P.
The parameter is used to automatically retrieve a key from specified key
protectors. The parameter may be repeated to specify any number of key
protectors. These are tried in order until one provides a usable key for any
given disk.
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
A key protector encapsulates functionality to retrieve an unlocking key
for a fully-encrypted disk from a specific source. A key protector
module registers itself with the key protectors framework when it is
loaded and unregisters when unloaded. Additionally, a key protector may
accept parameters that describe how it should operate.
The key protectors framework, besides offering registration and
unregistration functions, also offers a one-stop routine for finding and
invoking a key protector by name. If a key protector with the specified
name exists and if an unlocking key is successfully retrieved by it, the
function returns to the caller the retrieved key and its length.
Cc: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
In order to store the SBAT data we create a new ELF note. The string
".sbat", zero-padded to 4 byte alignment, shall be entered in the name
field. The string "SBAT"'s ASCII values, 0x53424154, should be entered
in the type field.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
For NX the GRUB binary has to announce that it is compatible with the
NX feature. This implies that when loading the executable GRUB image
several attributes are true:
- the binary doesn't need an executable stack,
- the binary doesn't need sections to be both executable and writable,
- the binary knows how to use the EFI Memory Attributes Protocol on code
it is loading.
This patch:
- adds a definition for the PE DLL Characteristics flag GRUB_PE32_NX_COMPAT,
- changes grub-mkimage to set that flag.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
For NX we need to set the page access permission attributes for write
and execute permissions. This patch adds two new primitives, grub_set_mem_attrs()
and grub_clear_mem_attrs(), and associated constants definitions used
for that purpose. For most platforms it adds a dummy implementation.
On EFI platforms it implements the primitives using the EFI Memory
Attribute Protocol, defined in UEFI 2.10 specification.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Currently .module_license is set writable, that is, the section has the
SHF_WRITE flag set, in the module's ELF headers. This probably never
actually matters but it can't possibly be correct. The patch sets that
data as "const" which causes that flag not to be set.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mate Kukri <mate.kukri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-By: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This is an x86-specific thing and should be available globally.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This fixes naming inconsistency that goes against coding style as well
as helps to avoid potential conflicts and confusion as this constant is
used in multiple places.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Currently rdmsr and wrmsr commands have own MSR support detection code.
This code is the same. So, it is duplicated. Additionally, this code
cannot be reused by others. Hence, extract this code to a function and
make it public. By the way, improve a code a bit.
Additionally, use GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE instead of GRUB_ERR_BUG to signal
an error because errors encountered by this new routine are not bugs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Use more obvious names which match corresponding instructions:
* grub_msr_read() => grub_rdmsr(),
* grub_msr_write() => grub_wrmsr().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
It does not make sense to have separate headers for individual static
functions. So, make one common place to store them.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Module structure has natural alignment of 4. Respect it explicitly
rather than relying on the fact that _end is usually aligned.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Current code works only if package matches binary name transformation rules.
It's often true but is not guaranteed.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?64410
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Type 0x01 was introduced with the ACPI DBGP table and type 0x12 was introduced
with the ACPI DBG2 table. Type 0x12 is used by the ACPI SPCR table on recent
AWS bare-metal instances (c6i/c7i). Also give each debug type a proper name.
Signed-off-by: Udo Steinberg <udo@hypervisor.org>
Reviewed-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Without them, e.g., 0x80LL on 64-bit target is 32-bit byte-swapped to
0xffffffff80000000 instead of correct 0x80000000.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add functionality to disable command line interface access and editing of GRUB
menu entries if GRUB image is built with --disable-cli.
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The following EROFS patch will use this helper to handle
ALIGN_UP() overflow.
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The "ground truth" stack protector cookie value is kept in a global
variable, and loaded in every function prologue and epilogue to store
it into resp. compare it with the stack slot holding the cookie.
If the comparison fails, the program aborts, and this might occur
spuriously when the global variable changes values between the entry and
exit of a function. This implies that assigning the global variable at
boot should not involve any instrumented function calls, unless special
care is taken to ensure that the live call stack is synchronized, which
is non-trivial.
So avoid any function calls, including grub_memcpy(), which is
unnecessary given that the stack cookie is always a suitably aligned
variable of the native word size.
While at it, leave the last byte 0x0 to avoid inadvertent unbounded
strings on the stack.
Note that the use of __attribute__((optimize)) is described as
unsuitable for production use in the GCC documentation, so let's drop
this as well now that it is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Otherwise the GRUB cannot start due to missing symbols when stack
protector is enabled on EFI platforms.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
The CMOS actually exists on most EFI platforms and in some cases is used to
store useful data that makes it justifiable for GRUB to read/write it.
As for date and time keep using EFI API and not CMOS one.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
No alignment is guaranteed and in fact on my IA-64 SAPIC is aligned
to 4 bytes instead of 8 and causes a trap. It affects only rarely used
lsacpi command and so went unnoticed.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
NetBSD uses slightly different function names for the same functions.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Introduce flags to identify PowerVM and KVM on Power and set them where
each type of host has been detected.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Rename regions_claim() to grub_regions_claim() to make it available for
memory allocation. The ieee1275 loader will use this function on PowerVM
and KVM on Power and thus avoid usage of memory that it is not allowed
to use.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Add support for memory alignment requirements and adjust a candidate
address to it before checking whether the block is large enough. This
must be done in this order since the alignment adjustment can make
a block smaller than what was requested.
None of the current callers has memory alignment requirements but the
ieee1275 loader for kernel and initrd will use it to convey them.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Return the allocated address of the memory block in the request structure
if a memory allocation was actually done. Leave the address untouched
otherwise. This enables a caller who wants to use the allocated memory
directly, rather than adding the memory to the heap, to see where memory
was allocated. None of the current callers need this but the converted
ieee1275 loader will make use of it.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Let the regions_claim() request structure's init_region determine whether
to call grub_mm_init_region() on it. This allows for adding memory to
GRUB's memory heap if init_region is set to true, or direct usage of the
memory otherwise. Set all current callers' init_region to true since they
want to add memory regions to GRUB's heap.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
The regions_claim() function limits the allocation of memory regions
by excluding certain memory areas from being used by GRUB. This for
example includes a gap between 640MB and 768MB as well as an upper
limit beyond which no memory may be used when an fadump is present.
However, the ieee1275 loader for kernel and initrd currently does not
use regions_claim() for memory allocation on PowerVM and KVM on Power
and therefore may allocate memory in those areas that it should not use.
To make the regions_claim() function more flexible and ultimately usable
for the ieee1275 loader, introduce a request structure to pass various
parameters to the regions_claim() function that describe the properties
of requested memory chunks. In a first step, move the total and flags
variables into this structure.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
On ia64 alignment requirements are strict. When we pass a pointer to
UUID it needs to be at least 4-byte aligned or EFI will crash.
On the other hand in device path there is no padding for UUID, so we
need 2 types in one formor another. Make 4-byte aligned and unaligned types
The code is structured in a way to accept unaligned inputs
in most cases and supply 4-byte aligned outputs.
Efiemu case is a bit ugly because there inputs and outputs are
reversed and so we need careful casts to account for this
inversion.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
gpt_partition contains grub_guid. We need to decide whether the whole
structure is unaligned and then we need to use packed_guid. But we never
have unaligned part entries as we read them in an aligned buffer from disk.
Hence just make it all aligned.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
We do table search in many places doing exactly the same algorithm.
The only minor variance in users is which table is used if several entries
are present. As specification mandates uniqueness and even if it ever isn't,
first entry is good enough, unify this code and always use the first entry.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
