Follow recent extensions of EFI support providing a TCG2 driver with
a public API for getting the maximum TPM command size and passing a TPM
command through to the TPM 2. Implement this functionality using ieee1275
PowerPC firmware API calls. Move tcg2.c into the TCG2 driver.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move tpm_get_tpm_version() into grub_ieee1275_tpm_init() and invalidate
grub_ieee1275_tpm_ihandle in case no TPM 2 could be detected. Try the
initialization only once so that grub_tpm_present() will always return
the same result. Use the grub_ieee1275_tpm_ihandle as indicator for an
available TPM instead of grub_ieee1275_tpm_version, which can now be
removed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move common initialization functions from the ibmvtpm driver module into
tcg2.c that will be moved into the new TCG2 driver in a subsequent patch.
Make the functions available to the ibmvtpm driver as public functions
and variables.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Consolidate repeated definitions of IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID that are cast
to the type grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t. On the occasion add "GRUB_" prefix to
the constant name.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cast 0 to proper type grub_ieee1275_ihandle_t. This type is
used for struct grub_serial_port's handle that assigns or
compares with IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The TPM bit fields need to be in reverse order for big endian targets,
such as ieee1275 PowerPC platforms that run GRUB in big endian mode.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Update the user manual to address TPM2 key protector including the two
related commands, tpm2_key_protector_init and tpm2_key_protector_clear,
and the user-space utility: grub-protect.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
For the tpm2_key_protector module, the TCG2 command submission function
is the only difference between a QEMU instance and grub-emu. To test
TPM2 key unsealing with a QEMU instance, it requires an extra OS image
to invoke grub-protect to seal the LUKS key, rather than a simple
grub-shell rescue CD image. On the other hand, grub-emu can share the
emulated TPM2 device with the host, so that we can seal the LUKS key on
host and test key unsealing with grub-emu.
This test script firstly creates a simple LUKS image to be loaded as a
loopback device in grub-emu. Then an emulated TPM2 device is created by
"swtpm chardev" and PCR 0 and 1 are extended.
There are several test cases in the script to test various settings. Each
test case uses grub-protect or tpm2-tools to seal the LUKS password
with PCR 0 and PCR 1. Then grub-emu is launched to load the LUKS image,
try to mount the image with tpm2_key_protector_init and cryptomount, and
verify the result.
Based on the idea from Michael Chang.
Cc: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
As a preparation to test tpm2_key_protector with grub-emu, the new
option, --tpm-device, is introduced to specify the TPM device for
grub-emu so that grub-emu can access an emulated TPM device from
the host.
Since grub-emu can directly access the device on host, it's easy to
implement the essential TCG2 command submission function with the
read/write functions and enable tpm2_key_protector module for grub-emu,
so that we can further test TPM2 key unsealing with grub-emu.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
When using disk auto-unlocking with TPM 2.0, the typical grub.cfg may
look like this:
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub/sealed.tpm
cryptomount -u <PART-UUID> -P tpm2
search --fs-uuid --set=root <FS-UUID>
Since the disk search order is based on the order of module loading, the
attacker could insert a malicious disk with the same FS-UUID root to
trick GRUB to boot into the malicious root and further dump memory to
steal the unsealed key.
Do defend against such an attack, we can specify the hint provided by
"grub-probe" to search the encrypted partition first:
search --fs-uuid --set=root --hint='cryptouuid/<PART-UUID>' <FS-UUID>
However, for LVM on an encrypted partition, the search hint provided by
"grub-probe" is:
--hint='lvmid/<VG-UUID>/<LV-UUID>'
It doesn't guarantee to look up the logical volume from the encrypted
partition, so the attacker may have the chance to fool GRUB to boot
into the malicious disk.
To minimize the attack surface, this commit tweaks the disk device search
in diskfilter to look up cryptodisk devices first and then others, so
that the auto-unlocked disk will be found first, not the attacker's disk.
Cc: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
An attacker may insert a malicious disk with the same crypto UUID and
trick GRUB to mount the fake root. Even though the key from the key
protector fails to unlock the fake root, it's not wiped out cleanly so
the attacker could dump the memory to retrieve the secret key. To defend
such attack, wipe out the cached key when we don't need it.
Cc: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
If a protector is specified, but it fails to unlock the disk, fall back
to asking for the passphrase.
Before requesting the passphrase, the error from the key protector(s)
has to be cleared, or the later code, e.g., LUKS code, may stop as
grub_errno is set. This commit prints error from the key protector(s)
and sets grub_errno to GRUB_ERR_NONE to have a fresh start.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Currently with the TPM2 protector, only SRK mode is supported and
NV index support is just a stub. Implement the NV index option.
Note: This only extends support on the unseal path. grub-protect
has not been updated. tpm2-tools can be used to insert a key into
the NV index.
An example of inserting a key using tpm2-tools:
# Get random key.
tpm2_getrandom 32 > key.dat
# Create primary object.
tpm2_createprimary -C o -g sha256 -G ecc -c primary.ctx
# Create policy object. `pcrs.dat` contains the PCR values to seal against.
tpm2_startauthsession -S session.dat
tpm2_policypcr -S session.dat -l sha256:7,11 -f pcrs.dat -L policy.dat
tpm2_flushcontext session.dat
# Seal key into TPM.
cat key.dat | tpm2_create -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -L policy.dat -i-
tpm2_load -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -n sealing.name -c sealing.ctx
tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c sealing.ctx 0x81000000
Then to unseal the key in GRUB, add this to grub.cfg:
tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x81000000 --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2
Signed-off-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit handles the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize command from the key file
in TPM 2.0 Key File format.
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is the essential command to support authorized
policy which allows the users to sign TPM policies with their own keys.
Per TPM 2.0 Key File [1], CommandPolicy for TPM2_PolicyAuthorize
comprises "TPM2B_PUBLIC pubkey", "TPM2B_DIGEST policy_ref", and
"TPMT_SIGNATURE signature". To verify the signature, the current policy
digest is hashed with the hash algorithm written in "signature", and then
"signature" is verified with the hashed policy digest and "pubkey". Once
TPM accepts "signature", TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is invoked to authorize the
signed policy.
To create the key file with authorized policy, here are the pcr-oracle [2]
commands:
# Generate the RSA key and create the authorized policy file
$ pcr-oracle \
--rsa-generate-key \
--private-key policy-key.pem \
--auth authorized.policy \
create-authorized-policy 0,2,4,7,9
# Seal the secret with the authorized policy
$ pcr-oracle \
--key-format tpm2.0 \
--auth authorized.policy \
--input disk-secret.txt \
--output sealed.key \
seal-secret
# Sign the predicted PCR policy
$ pcr-oracle \
--key-format tpm2.0 \
--private-key policy-key.pem \
--from eventlog \
--stop-event "grub-file=grub.cfg" \
--after \
--input sealed.key \
--output /boot/efi/efi/grub/sealed.tpm \
sign 0,2,4,7,9
Then specify the key file and the key protector to grub.cfg in the EFI
system partition:
tpm2_key_protector_init -a RSA --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed.tpm
cryptomount -u <PART_UUID> -P tpm2
For any change in the boot components, just run the "sign" command again
to update the signature in sealed.tpm, and TPM can unseal the key file
with the updated PCR policy.
[1] https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html
[2] https://github.com/okirch/pcr-oracle
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To utilize the key protectors framework, there must be a way to protect
full-disk encryption keys in the first place. The grub-protect tool
includes support for the TPM2 key protector but other protectors that
require setup ahead of time can be supported in the future.
For the TPM2 key protector, the intended flow is for a user to have
a LUKS 1 or LUKS 2-protected fully-encrypted disk. The user then creates
a new LUKS key file, say by reading /dev/urandom into a file, and creates
a new LUKS key slot for this key. Then, the user invokes the grub-protect
tool to seal this key file to a set of PCRs using the system's TPM 2.0.
The resulting sealed key file is stored in an unencrypted partition such
as the EFI System Partition (ESP) so that GRUB may read it. The user also
has to ensure the cryptomount command is included in GRUB's boot script
and that it carries the requisite key protector (-P) parameter.
Sample usage:
$ dd if=/dev/urandom of=luks-key bs=1 count=32
$ sudo cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/sdb1 luks-key --pbkdf=pbkdf2 --hash=sha512
To seal the key with TPM 2.0 Key File (recommended):
$ sudo grub-protect --action=add \
--protector=tpm2 \
--tpm2-pcrs=0,2,4,7,9 \
--tpm2key \
--tpm2-keyfile=luks-key \
--tpm2-outfile=/boot/efi/efi/grub/sealed.tpm
Or, to seal the key with the raw sealed key:
$ sudo grub-protect --action=add \
--protector=tpm2 \
--tpm2-pcrs=0,2,4,7,9 \
--tpm2-keyfile=luks-key \
--tpm2-outfile=/boot/efi/efi/grub/sealed.key
Then, in the boot script, for TPM 2.0 Key File:
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed.tpm
cryptomount -u <SDB1_UUID> -P tpm2
Or, for the raw sealed key:
tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed.key --pcrs=0,2,4,7,9
cryptomount -u <SDB1_UUID> -P tpm2
The benefit of using TPM 2.0 Key File is that the PCR set is already
written in the key file, so there is no need to specify PCRs when
invoking tpm2_key_protector_init.
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Add a new parameter to cryptomount to support the key protectors framework: -P.
The parameter is used to automatically retrieve a key from specified key
protectors. The parameter may be repeated to specify any number of key
protectors. These are tried in order until one provides a usable key for any
given disk.
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
The TPM2 key protector is a module that enables the automatic retrieval
of a fully-encrypted disk's unlocking key from a TPM 2.0.
The theory of operation is such that the module accepts various
arguments, most of which are optional and therefore possess reasonable
defaults. One of these arguments is the keyfile/tpm2key parameter, which
is mandatory. There are two supported key formats:
1. Raw Sealed Key (--keyfile)
When sealing a key with TPM2_Create, the public portion of the sealed
key is stored in TPM2B_PUBLIC, and the private portion is in
TPM2B_PRIVATE. The raw sealed key glues the fully marshalled
TPM2B_PUBLIC and TPM2B_PRIVATE into one file.
2. TPM 2.0 Key (--tpm2key)
The following is the ASN.1 definition of TPM 2.0 Key File:
TPMPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
CommandCode [0] EXPLICIT INTEGER
CommandPolicy [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
}
TPMAuthPolicy ::= SEQUENCE {
Name [0] EXPLICIT UTF8STRING OPTIONAL
Policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy
}
TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
policy [1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL
secret [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
authPolicy [3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL
description [4] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL,
rsaParent [5] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
parent INTEGER
pubkey OCTET STRING
privkey OCTET STRING
}
The TPM2 key protector only expects a "sealed" key in DER encoding,
so "type" is always 2.23.133.10.1.5, "emptyAuth" is "TRUE", and
"secret" is empty. "policy" and "authPolicy" are the possible policy
command sequences to construct the policy digest to unseal the key.
Similar to the raw sealed key, the public portion (TPM2B_PUBLIC) of
the sealed key is stored in "pubkey", and the private portion
(TPM2B_PRIVATE) is in "privkey".
For more details: https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html
This sealed key file is created via the grub-protect tool. The tool
utilizes the TPM's sealing functionality to seal (i.e., encrypt) an
unlocking key using a Storage Root Key (SRK) to the values of various
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). These PCRs reflect the state
of the system as it boots. If the values are as expected, the system
may be considered trustworthy, at which point the TPM allows for a
caller to utilize the private component of the SRK to unseal (i.e.,
decrypt) the sealed key file. The caller, in this case, is this key
protector.
The TPM2 key protector registers two commands:
- tpm2_key_protector_init: Initializes the state of the TPM2 key
protector for later usage, clearing any
previous state, too, if any.
- tpm2_key_protector_clear: Clears any state set by tpm2_key_protector_init.
The way this is expected to be used requires the user to, either
interactively or, normally, via a boot script, initialize/configure
the key protector and then specify that it be used by the "cryptomount"
command (modifications to this command are in a different patch).
For instance, to unseal the raw sealed key file:
tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-1.key
cryptomount -u <PART1_UUID> -P tpm2
tpm2_key_protector_init --keyfile=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-2.key --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount -u <PART2_UUID> -P tpm2
Or, to unseal the TPM 2.0 Key file:
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-1.tpm
cryptomount -u <PART1_UUID> -P tpm2
tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/efi/grub/sealed-2.tpm --pcrs=7,11
cryptomount -u <PART2_UUID> -P tpm2
If a user does not initialize the key protector and attempts to use it
anyway, the protector returns an error.
Before unsealing the key, the TPM2 key protector follows the "TPMPolicy"
sequences to enforce the TPM policy commands to construct a valid policy
digest to unseal the key.
For the TPM 2.0 Key files, "authPolicy" may contain multiple "TPMPolicy"
sequences, the TPM2 key protector iterates "authPolicy" to find a valid
sequence to unseal key. If "authPolicy" is empty or all sequences in
"authPolicy" fail, the protector tries the one from "policy". In case
"policy" is also empty, the protector creates a "TPMPolicy" sequence
based on the given PCR selection.
For the raw sealed key, the TPM2 key protector treats the key file as a
TPM 2.0 Key file without "authPolicy" and "policy", so the "TPMPolicy"
sequence is always based on the PCR selection from the command
parameters.
This commit only supports one policy command: TPM2_PolicyPCR. The
command set will be extended to support advanced features, such as
authorized policy, in the later commits.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Software Stack (TSS) provides logic to
compose and submit TPM commands and parse responses.
A limited number of TPM commands may be accessed via the EFI TCG2
protocol. This protocol exposes functionality that is primarily geared
toward TPM usage within the context of Secure Boot. For all other TPM
commands, however, such as sealing and unsealing, this protocol does not
provide any help, with the exception of passthrough command submission.
The SubmitCommand method allows a caller to send raw commands to the
system's TPM and to receive the corresponding response. These
command/response pairs are formatted using the TPM wire protocol. To
construct commands in this way, and to parse the TPM's response, it is
necessary to, first, possess knowledge of the various TPM structures, and,
second, of the TPM wire protocol itself.
As such, this patch includes implementations of various grub_tpm2_* functions
(inventoried below), and logic to write and read command and response
buffers, respectively, using the TPM wire protocol.
Functions:
- grub_tpm2_create(),
- grub_tpm2_createprimary(),
- grub_tpm2_evictcontrol(),
- grub_tpm2_flushcontext(),
- grub_tpm2_load(),
- grub_tpm2_pcr_read(),
- grub_tpm2_policygetdigest(),
- grub_tpm2_policypcr(),
- grub_tpm2_readpublic(),
- grub_tpm2_startauthsession(),
- grub_tpm2_unseal(),
- grub_tpm2_loadexternal(),
- grub_tpm2_hash(),
- grub_tpm2_verifysignature(),
- grub_tpm2_policyauthorize(),
- grub_tpm2_testparms().
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit adds the necessary TPM2 types and structs as the preparation
for the TPM2 Software Stack (TSS2) support. The Marshal/Unmarshal
functions are also added to handle the data structure to be submitted to
TPM2 commands and to be received from the response.
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
As the preparation to support TPM2 Software Stack (TSS2), this commit
implements the TPM2 buffer handling functions to pack data for the TPM2
commands and unpack the data from the response.
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
A key protector encapsulates functionality to retrieve an unlocking key
for a fully-encrypted disk from a specific source. A key protector
module registers itself with the key protectors framework when it is
loaded and unregisters when unloaded. Additionally, a key protector may
accept parameters that describe how it should operate.
The key protectors framework, besides offering registration and
unregistration functions, also offers a one-stop routine for finding and
invoking a key protector by name. If a key protector with the specified
name exists and if an unlocking key is successfully retrieved by it, the
function returns to the caller the retrieved key and its length.
Cc: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Document libtasn1 in docs/grub-dev.texi and add the upgrade steps.
Also add the patches to make libtasn1 compatible with GRUB code.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Import tests from libtasn1 that use functionality we import.
This test module is integrated into functional_test so that the
user can run the test in GRUB shell.
This doesn't test the full decoder but that will be exercised in
test suites for coming patch sets.
Add testcase target in accordance with commit 5e10be48e5 (tests: Add
check-native and check-nonnative make targets).
Cc: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Create a wrapper file that specifies the module license.
Set up the makefile so it is built.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
There is a testcase to test the values larger than "int" but smaller
than "long". However, for some architectures, "long" and "int" are the
same and the compiler may issue a warning like this:
grub-core/tests/asn1/tests/Test_overflow.c:48:50: error: left shift of negative value [-Werror=shift-negative-value]
unsigned long num = ((long) GRUB_UINT_MAX) << 2;
^~
To avoid unnecessary error the testcase is enabled only when
GRUB_LONG_MAX is larger than GRUB_INT_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit replaces printf() and fprintf() with grub_printf() to print
the error messages for the testcases. Besides, asn1_strerror() is used
to convert the result code to strings instead of asn1_perror().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit removes the "verbose" variables and the unnecessary printf()
to simplify the output.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Some testcases use exit() to end the test. Since all the asn1 testcases
are invoked as functions, this commit replaces exit() with return to
reflect the test results, so that the main test function can check the
results.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit changes the main functions in the testcases to the test
names so that the real "main" test function can invokes them.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit removes all the headers and only uses asn1_test.h.
To avoid including int.h from grub-core/lib/libtasn1-grub/lib,
CONST_DOWN is defined in reproducers.c.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
In _asn1_tag_der(), the first while loop for the long form may end up
with a "k" value with "ASN1_MAX_TAG_SIZE" and cause the buffer overrun
in the second while loop. This commit tweaks the conditional check to
avoid producing a too large "k".
This is a quick fix and may differ from the official upstream fix.
libtasn1 issue: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/libtasn1/-/issues/49
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Replace a 64-bit division with a call to grub_divmod64(), preventing
creation of __udivdi3() calls on 32-bit platforms.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Since libtasn1.h is the header to be included by users, including the
standard POSIX headers in libtasn1.h would force the user to add the
CFLAGS/CPPFLAGS for the POSIX headers.
This commit adjusts the header paths to use the grub headers instead of
the standard POSIX headers, so that users only need to include
libtasn1.h to use libtasn1 functions.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
strcat() is not available in GRUB. This commit replaces strcat() and
_asn1_strcat() with the bounds-checking _asn1_str_cat().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
strcat() is not available in GRUB. This commit replaces strcat() with
strcpy() in _asn1_str_cat() as the preparation to replace other strcat()
with the bounds-checking _asn1_str_cat().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
We don't expect to be able to write ASN.1, only read it,
so we can disable some code.
Do that with #if 0/#endif, rather than deletion. This means
that the difference between upstream and GRUB is smaller,
which should make updating libtasn1 easier in the future.
With these exclusions we also avoid the need for minmax.h,
which is convenient because it means we don't have to
import it from gnulib.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Unlike files accessed via a normal file system, the file->read_hook() is
not honoured when using blocklist notation.
This means that when trying to use a dedicated, 1 KiB, raw partition
for the environment block and hence does something like
save_env --file=(hd0,gpt9)0+2 X Y Z
this fails with "sparse file not allowed", which is rather unexpected,
as I've explicitly said exactly which blocks should be used. Adding
a little debugging reveals that grub_file_size(file) is 1024 as expected,
but total_length is 0, simply because the callback was never invoked, so
blocklists is an empty list.
Fix that by honouring the ->read_hook() set by the caller, also when
a "file" is specified with blocklist notation.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Correct the documentation for the grub.cfg searching via network that
will be done based on ethernet type, -01, which was missing, and a given
MAC address.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?65152
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Correct documentation for UEFI secure boot to remove statement that
chainloader does not work with secure boot. This was fixed by the commit
6d05264 (kern/efi/sb: Add chainloaded image as shim's verifiable object).
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?62004
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Correct documentation for pxe_default_server, pxe_default_gatway and
pxe_blksize. Only pxe_default_server is actually used (alias for
net_default_server). So, capture this and remove the other two.
Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?54480
Signed-off-by: Andrew Hamilton <adhamilt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Multiboot modules that could not be read successfully, e.g. via network,
should not be added to the list of modules to forward to the operating
system that is to be booted subsequently.
This patch is necessary because even if a grub.cfg checks whether or not
a module was successfully downloaded, it is futile to retry a failed
download as the corrupted module will be forwarded either way.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Gehrke <valentin.gehrke@kernkonzept.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The SBAT metadata is read from CSV file and transformed into an ELF note
with the -s option.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In order to store the SBAT data we create a new ELF note. The string
".sbat", zero-padded to 4 byte alignment, shall be entered in the name
field. The string "SBAT"'s ASCII values, 0x53424154, should be entered
in the type field.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Rename has been skipped by mistake in the original commit.
Fixes: 94649c026 (nx: Set page permissions for loaded modules)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
